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In the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No.
IRA B. SHARP and LOIS C. SHARP,
Defendants and Respondents,

7368

HOWELLS LIVESTOCK, INC.,
a corporation,
Intervener a.nd Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and plaintiff sets forth as its statement of
facts the following:
The plaintiff Deseret Livestock Company is a Utah
corporation organized and doing business under and
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah since 1891,
and succeeding to the interests of a number of individuals
who had operated in the same manner for many years
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prior to 1891 (Tt. P. 575) This Company has lands in
Rich County, in eastern Utah, which comprise spring,
summer and autumn grazing for its sheep, and in western
Utah, Tooele County, it has located other lands and grazing
rights, which comprise its winter grazing. Twice each
year this Company historically has moved its sheep from
one range to the other, the movement in the spring from
the winter grazing lands in Tooele County to its Summer
lands in Rich County, and the movement in the fall being
from Rich County lands to the Tooele County lands.
(Tr. P. 8)
The general movement of the sheep from the winter
lands to the summer lands in the spring takes place during
the month of April, and in the fall, in the latter part of
November.
In Tooele County the Deseret Livestock Company
has its main ranch located at the old Hawaiian settlement
of Iosepa, which locality is approximately sixteen miles
south of Highway 40 as it crosses the tip of the Stansbury
Mountains, and said ranch is located at the west foothills
of the said Stansbury Range. Between the ranch at losepa
and the point of the mountain at Highway 40 the Deseret
Livestock Company has purchased and leased considerable
acreage along the west foothills of the Stansbury Range,
which are in close proximity to or are crossed by the present county highway as it proceeds north and south through
Skull Valley. Along this stretch of sixteen miles are a
number of springs which are located within approximately
a half mile of the said highway. This area is illustrated
by the following map:
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Particularly the lands of the plaintiff corpGration
within this area are owned or leased in the following manner: In Township 1 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, which comprises the four miles immediately south from Highway 40; the lands in Sections
16 and 32 are owned by and a.re in the name of the State
of Utah but are being purchased under contract by Thomas
Jeremy and are leased by the Deseret Livestock Company
from Jer,emy. This is likewise true of the East Half of
the East Half of Section 29; Northwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter of Section 29; East Half of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 20, and the Southwest Quarter of the
West Half of the Southeast Quarter, and the Northwest
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 21. This area is
shown on the plat in diagonal lines northwest by southeast.
Transcript Page 594
The following lands are owned in fee by the Deseret
Livestock Company and Ethan Jeremy and have had
patent issued for less than twenty years as of the date
of the filing of the complaint: All of Section 36, Township
2 South, Range 8 West, and all of Section 2, Township
3 South, Range 8 West; Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, Township 1 South, Range
7 West; Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 7 West, and Lot
1, Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 7 West. These
lands are shown on the plat by diagonal lines southwest by
northeast. Exhibit # 10, 11 and 9 of Defendants.
The lands above described, and particularly those
located within the area four miles south of Highway 40,

1

I
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have been leased and purchased by the plaintiff company
to provide a source of feed and resting ground to permit
the plaintiff Company to hold its sheep while it is loading
on to the trains and shipping from Timpie Point, a loading
station on the Western Pacific Railway at the north tip
of the Stansbury Range. As shown by the evidence, the
sole value of the land is for its feed. (Tr. P. 15)
Defendants Ira B. Sharp and wife formed a partnership under which they purchased the sheep of the Howells
Livestock, Inc., the partnership having by purchase received title to a number of sheep representing seventyfive per cent., and the corporation retaining twenty-five
percent. of the sheep; this purchase having been made
shortly after the death of David Howells in 1939. (Tr. P.
415) The trespasses herein complained of commenced
several years after the Sharps took over. (Tr. P. 13)
Skull Valley in Tooele County, Utah is a typical desert
waste, bounded by the Stansbury Mountains on the east
and Cedar Mountain on the west, and is approximately
fifteen miles in width, and extends from Great Salt Lake
on the north and south in excess of forty or fifty miles.
Except for the Deseret Livestock Company ranch at Iosepa,
where a comparative few acres of improved land are fenced,
there does not appear any evidence that any of the other
land in the en tire valley is fenced except a small acreage
around Muskrat Springs and Burnt Springs, the latter
being two of the springs heretofore mentioned as within
close proximity to the county highway through Skull
Valley. (De£. Ex. 5)
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The Sharp and Howells Livestock Inc. interests have
their winter range at Dugway and Trout Creek, in Southwestern Tooele County and their rights extend over into
Nevada. The winter range of the Deseret Livestock Company covers all of Skull Valley, and is located particularly
in the south and west part of Skull Valley on what is known
as ((Cedar Mountain". (Tr. P. 63)
In the spring the sheep of the Deseret Livestock
Company are brought east from the west part of the
valley to losepa, and then trailed north up the east side
of Skull Valley in the general area of the county road, to
the shipping point at Tim pie (a Western Pacific yard at
the north tip of the Stansbury Range). (Tr. P. 63)
The Howells Livestock, Inc. and Sharp interests trail
from the area to the south and west of Skull Valley and
proceed north through the valley, and from losepa north
they have historically followed the county road from
losepa to Timpie Point, being along the same course as
that followed by plaintiff. At the Deseret Livestock
Company ranch at losepa, this county road is bounded
on either side for a half mile by fences, with the width
between the fences approximately 100 feet (P. 93 of
Neff deposition)

~I

~~~

In 1946 Sharp had been advi~ed where the Deseret
Livestock Company lands ~ere located, and Sharp had
been told to stay below the present county highway with
his sheep where necessary to avoid these lands. (Tr. P. 13)
In 1947 the herders for Sharp, and Sharp himself, were
told to keep their herds below this county highway, and
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to stay off the land of plaintiff. (Tr. P. 13; P. 55) The
herders were told by Sharp, nevertheless, to stay out of
the greasewood. (Tr. P. 55) Because of the fact that
the Sharp herders under instructions held their sheep back
and actually fed and bedded them upon the land which
the plaintiff Company was reserving for its herds, this
action was brought to enjoin this threatened continued
trespass.
The defendants and intervener by their counterclaim (Par. 12) asserted a right to trail their animals over
a ((well-defined trail and roadway in common with other
members of the public, which trail is in excess of 15 0 feet
wide and is situated in Tooele County, State of Utah,
and more particularly described in Exhibit B attached
hereto and hereby referred to and made a part hereof."
Par. 15 of the counterclaim further asserts that said
tttrail and roadway and Burnt Spring were in existence at
the time the plaintiff's lands were public domain, and that
the said trail and roadway were at that time a public highway and used by the public generally for the purpose of
trailing sheep."
In the prayer of the cross-complaint the defendants
ask that rr said trail and roadway be found to be a public
grazing livestock in the area, or, in the alternative, that.,
such trail be found to be a private easement vested in
Howells Livestock."
In Exhibit B attached to that complaint the trail and
roadway is described in general course through various
sections without any particularity as to the roadway and
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without connection by metes and bounds to any corners,
and without locating the roadway other than it is said to
be within a certain section.
In Par. 14 of the complaint in intervention the intervener describes the same general course of the claimed trail
as it is described in the defendants' Exhibit B. However,
there is attached to the complaint in intervention a document marked ((Exhibit C," upon which is located in dotted
lines the claimed trail or roadway, with the trail beyond the
dotted lines to be evidenced by the present county highway.
The trial of this cause extended over several days, and,
as shown by minute entry of July 16, 1948 (R. 86), both
parties on the 16th day of July, 1948, rested, with the
plaintiff being granted permission to reopen the case for
the purpose of placing of record its patent to the property,
whereupon uthe matter was by court taken under advisement."
On October 4, 1948, the intervener filed a motion to
amend its complaint in intervention and reopen its case
to show a survey of the road. This motion appears on Page
87 of the record, and in that the intervener claims the
trail covered all of the property of the plaintiff heretofore
described which is located between the new county road
and the foothills to the east for the purpose of trailing
and grazing its sheep, and by which use since prior to 1911,
the intervener claims an easen~ent in gross to trail across
the property and to graze 14,000 of its sheep on the property by trailing between the county road and the foothills

1
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on the east, and thereby asserting a right to trail and graze
on all the lands of the plain tiff in this area, under assertion
of an easement in gross.
At the time of the hearing on this motion the Court
permitted the amendment over the objection of plaintiff,
and permitted the defendants and intervener to introduce testimony of a survey of a purported course which
the Court had walked over a portion of the area and which
was entirely different from any course testified to by any
witness in the trial. (Tr. P. 522, 690, 610, 606)
In its judgement the lower court found that there
exists a public road 100 feet wide, and the center line of
that road is particularly described; that the road is in
existence and had never been abandoned; that the intervener had a prescriptive right to trail 11,000 sheep and to
graze the same along the described trail for a public road
during the spring and fall, and to spread the sheep along the
course of the public road from the grease woods on the
west to the foothills on the east, to a total width of approximately 3000 feet; that the plaintiff had no right, title
or interest in and to the waters of Burnt Spring; that
the intervener had established a right by prescription to
water 11,000 sheep at Burnt Spring, and to spread them
,~ over a width of 500 feet on each side of the spring to a
point 800 feet distant from the headwater. That inter-~ venor had a prespective right in addition to trail and graze
all of Sect. 36 T 2 S. 8w and Sect. 2 T 3S. R. 8W.

The Court denied any injunctive relief to the plaintiff
-· and denied recovery for any damages resulting from tres:\· passing.
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The history back of the traveled roads in Skull Valley
is best reflected in plaintiff's ((Exhibit A", which is a map
or plat of this area taken from the official files of the recorder's office of Tooele County, Utah, and stipulated as
being part of its official records. This map was prepared
for Tooele County by T. K. Ward, Engineer, and it shows
the various roads and trails as they existed in Tooele County
prior to 1920. The roadway which appears in the lower
righthand part of the exhibit and extends south along the
west edge of the Stansbury Range represents the old Lincoln
Highway, and the present new or county roadway is not
shown on that exhibit. The exhibit had been prepared
prior to the time that road was constructed. No alternate
road or trail running north and south appears on that map.
The Court will notice on this exhibit that a number of
old trails are indicated upon the plat in dotted lines. This
old road was the old Lincoln Highway, and it still carries
the old sandstone markers which were erected as part of the
markings of the Lincoln Highway. This road is the most
westerly of the two heavy lines appearing on Defendants'
Exhibit 22.

In connection with ((Exhibit A", we desire to call 1~
the Court's attention particularly to the dotted lines which m~ 1
extend from the center of Section 6, Township 2 South, 1001
Range 7 West and extending in a northwesterly direction to ~l
Highway 40; also the dotted lines running from the old ~~
highway east up into the Stansbury Mountains from Musk- ~ve
rat Spring in Section 13, Township 2 South, Range 8 West; ~er
a dotted line extending from Section 34, Township 2 South, ~n
Range 8 West, and to the dotted line evidencing an old ~to

I
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roadway running east and northwest through Sections I6
and I7, Township I South, Range 7 West. These old trails
apparently are the only ones evidenced upon the ground
sufficient to have received the description or characterization of a trail at the time this plat was prepared.
Particularly do we desire to point out to the Court
that there is nothing on this plat in the official records of
Tooele County, which shows any trail or road running
north and south other than the old Lincoln Highway
marked by two heavy lines on plaintiff's ((Exhibit A".
This old Lincoln Highway is evidenced on this serial
photo of defendants' ExhibitS, and is the more westerly of
the roads mentioned.
Clearly appearing upon plaintiff's ((Exhibit A", and
likewise reflected in defendents' serial photo, Exhibit S, are
the trails which we have heretofore pointed out as appearing on plaintiff's ((Exhibit A". This old Lincoln Highway as it now appears on the ground is best evidenced by
plaintiff's ((Exhibit M"-a photograph.
Historically, Skull Valley has contained not more
than four ranches,-the first of which appears at Iosepa,
and three others appear to the south at points where there
is some water emanating from the higher mountains of
the Stansbury Range. (Neff Deposition P. 65) Except
for the short period of time when the old Lincoln Highway
traversed this valley, there was no use made of any road
other than for the purpose of serving these very few residents and the Indians located on the reservation at the
south end of the valley. (Neff Dep. P. 67) The country
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is typical of the western desert of Utah, being alkali and
of light clay texture and being subject to rapid erosion,
so much so that the track of a single wagon in wet weather
will, by washing of the rain, remain a permanent mark
on the ground. (Tr. P. 561)
Throughout the trial the claim of the defendants and
intervener was that there was an old third road or wetweather road which was located along the foothills to the
east of the old Lincoln Highway and the present county
road, which was used when the old road was impassible.
The evidence shows, nevertheless, that the only road in
that area upon which any work was done by Tooele
County was the old Lincoln Highway by the placing of
markings, culverts and grading, and then, in the middle
1920's, began the construction of the present or new
County Road through that area, which was done by the
county running a grader over a straight course through

the valley and avoiding the curves of the old lower county

I!

roadway.

:n

(P. 467 and 484 of Transcript)

Since the construction of this new County Road, for
which no rights-of-way were secured, but which was
erected in true country fashion without the securing of
a right-of-way but by oral consent of the two or three
residents of the valley, no other road has been recognized
by the county. (Tr. P. 468)
The history of the operations of Defendant's witness
Samuel Neff appears in his deposition, which is made a
part of the record in this case. In that deposition Neff
states at Page 54 of the Deposition that he :first commenced

:n

I :u
I
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operations in Skull Valley in 189 3 in partnership with his
brother. This partnership started with one band of sheep
and they were wintered in the Skull Valley area and summered above Coalville, in Summit County, and were trailed
between Summit County and Skull Valley in moving
from the winter to the summer range and from the summer
to the winter range,-the sheep being driven from Coalville up Silver Creek to Parleys Canyon, down into Emigration Canyon, across Salt Lake Valley, across the northern tip of Rush Valley to the Stansbury Range, and then
south into Skull Valley. It is well to point out to the
Court at this point that in describing the operations for
all of the time in which he was connected with them from
1893 through 1926, Neff states that as to the area from
Timpie Point to Iosepa they were always trailing through
that area and were not grazing.
In 1907 a corporation was formed under the name of
Neff Brothers Livestock Company. What property went
into the corporation is not shown by evidence. This corporation was sold in its entirety to the Wright Brothers, as
appears at Page 55 of the Deposition, where Neff states:
uwe sold them our sheep, the camp outfits and our range
in Summit County east of Coalville", and at Page 56 Neff
states that for a year they went out of the livestock business. This occurred in 1910.

\

,\

A year later the partnership started operation again
until 1921, when a corporation was formed known as the
Neff Brothers Land & Livestock Company, this being an
entirely new and different corporation. Mr. Neff continued as manager and operator of the corporation until
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1926, when his entire stock interest was sold to David
Howells. The corporation continued until the death of
David Howells and the time when the Sharp partnership
took over in 1939.

At Page 70 the witness Neff states that in their operations from the time they entered Tooele County, they were
actually in their winter grazing area. In describing their
operations as they left Timpie Point and moved South,
Neff, at Page 79, in response to the question:

((Q. Your usual course of travel, however, was
to have your wagons move up what you refer to as
the old road, the lower road, is that correct?~.·
'i'

((A. In dry weather our wagons would follow
the main highway because it was easier traveling;
wasn't so rough. Then when they were ready to
camp at night they would pull up east of the road
to where the herder wanted to camp with the sheep
over night."

?'

At Page 12 of the deposition Neff states that the
reason the sheep would not be taken down by the old
Lincoln Highway was because in wet weather it was muddy
and the mud was not good for the sheep.
At Page 14 Neff states in his direct examination that
the usual method would be to travel the old Lincoln Highway and turn up to the east at night with t~e herd, but
that ((if the weather happened to be wet, and the lower
road was muddy, there was an upper road we used to go
over with the animals."
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Neff at Page 80 of the deposition states that the lower
road was 300 feet from the spring and the upper road
was nquite some distance actually from the spring, the
spring coming out from under a ledge to the west of the
road."
In his entire deposition Neff was not able to describe
the actual course by land marks which this upper road
might take.
At Page 83, in referring to the light line appearing on
the aerial photo, defendants' Exhibit 5, and referring to
the light line which the witnesses of the defendants, Sorensen and Sharp, marked for defendants as their claimed
upper road, Neff states:

Q. But that would not be this main upper road
that you were referring to?
nA. It probably isn't, because I know the upper
road came out here and took a bend down to the
spring."
(This point referred to as nhere" Neff identifies at
Page 84 as the township line between 1 and 2 South, where
a knoll appears on the township line.)
At Page 84 Neff again states that the object of this
upper road was to keep up there out of the soft country
in wet weather .
At Page 85 the question was asked Neff:

uQ. It was more or less of a turn out only when
there was bad weather?"
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To which he answered:
teA. That was the object of taking the road
around that way."
Defendants introduced 1n evidence their Exhibit 5,
which is an aerial photograph of the east side of Skull
Valley from Tim pie Point to the Deseret Livestock Company ranch at Iosepa. They had their witnesses Alton H.
Sorensen and Ira Sharp testify in identifying the map and
in identifying the purported upper road. Objection had
been made by the plaintiff to the fact that the purported
road or easement had not been identified in the pleadings
by sufficient description to permit it to get by a general
demurrer, and objection was made to the attempt on the
part of plaintiff to have its engineer Sorensen identify this
purported road on the map as being a road upon which he
walked, for the reason that it was not identified with any
of the pleadings or any other testimony.
At Page 109 of the record George M. Cannon, one of
the attorneys for defendants, states in connection with
the testimony of Sorensen as outlined above:

((May as well make our position clear. We expect to show that this is a high county road, what
they call the high road, and that it is the road used '\::
away back in the early 90's as a high road during
the wet season over which our sheep outfit went
and over which wagons and other vehicles traveled
during the wet season. I want this witness to ex- :.~ 1
plain the condition of that road at the present ·.,
time."
1

1

! ...J
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Again, at Page 241 of the transcript, Edward W.
Clyde, also of counsel for defendants and intervener, in
describing the rights that defendants and intervener were
claiming over the property of the plain tiff, states:
t(We have either got one as public highway, or
prescription, since it passed to private ownership,
or we are going to have to condemn one by way of
necessity. We are not trying to in this action."
Again, at Page 207, Mr. Clyde states:
t(Mr. Clyde: Now, your Honor, the big block
of this country under the testimony of Mr. Sorensen of Deseret Land & Livestock Company even
now is owned by the public.
THE COURT: Yes, but you have a little more
interest than a road here. You may have a prescriptive right for your client, may you not?
Mr. Clyde: Correct, but we are trying to show
both public and prescriptive, and I am not trying
to show prescriptive by this witness."

This comment resulted from a discussion relative to
plaintiff's cross-examination of Joseph Stillman, a witness
::. for the defendants, to the effect that Skull Valley was a
~ · wide, broad and flat valley several miles east and west, and
~j
at through all of which sheep men have driven their sheep.
Again at Page 3 54 of the record, in explaining the
position of the defendants and their claim to either a
. public or private right-of-way through the country, and
in his argument on an objection to the examination of the
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witness relative to land at Timpie, Mr. Clyde states: ((I
think this is the black acre Mr. Burton has found for us
that we have tied our trail appurtenant to. Apparently
we have got a ranch at Timpie," so that the defendants were
looking for some means of asserting a right to claim a
private right-of-way by showing they had purchased some
property which had appurtenant to it their claimed rightof-way, and, as indicated at Page 354, the defendants
would have to amend to be able to sustain this issue.
The defendants and intervener, from the time of
taking the deposition of Neff through all the presentation
of the ·Case, were faced with a dilemma in that if all of Skull
Valley was winter grazing land, then no trail or county
road could be shown; and in order to show that the area
from Timpie to losepa was trail, and was not used by the
defendants or intervener or the public as grazing land,
the defendants and intervener by all of their witnesses had
them testify that they were trailing and were not grazing
through that area. Typical of this testimony are the following quotations from the witnesses:

l~i~

Samuel Neff, at Page 92 of his deposition: ((We were
always trailing through there."
Jasper Brown, at Page 107 of the transcript:

((Q. Now, if you held sheep pointed in a given
direction, say, southwest through Skull Valley, and
moved them a distance of, say, six miles per day,
would you, as a stock man, say that you were
grazing those sheep or that you were trailing them?
((A. You are trailing."
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Again, at Page 87, in speaking of all the herds of sheep
he saw going through there, Jasper Brown states: uThey
trailed along the upper road near to the mountain."
W. E. Matthews typifies the type of his examination
and testimony on Page 213 of the transcript, where he
was asked:
uQ. And during that time were the sheep trailed
in herds in the fall going south from Timpie Point
down toward Iosepa?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you see the herds trailing?

A. Yes."
Joseph Stillman, at Page 223 of the record in his
direct testimony, and typifying his testimony, also was
asked:
uQ. Can you think of others that were trailing
their sheep from Timpie south toward Brown's
ranch during those years?
A. Jeremys.
Q. Was he trailing as early as 1900?
A. I am quite sure that he trailed until then."
At Page 224 Stillman states: uBrowns trailed."
At Page 225 Mr. Clyde asked Stillman: uAt the times
you trailed your sheep, what trail did you follow?"
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Peter A. Jensen, a herder for defendants, at Page 323
of the record was asked by Mr. Clyde if he accompanied
his sheep as they trailed from Timpie Point to losepa Ranch.
At Page 3 66 of the transcript, Witness Clark, a sheep
herder for the defendants, testified that he and the other
herders drove through that area, making five to six or more
miles per day. Describing the course they followed, on
direct testimony Clark says that in driving the sheep they
followed ttright along close to the highway and east".
This same Witness Clark, at Page 374 of the record,
speaking of their practice, stated, ttl£ nobody is around to
bother me, I will spread them and fill them up just as
much as I possibly can: always did and always will." In
his testimony Clark testified he was advised in 1947 that he
was not to go on the private lands of Deseret Livestock
Company, and stated, ttYes, I had been told that I had to
stay below the road."
And Clark testifying as to his instructions from Sharp,
states:

I

~;

J

~I

ttQ. In fact, Ira Sharp told you to go on it"
(Deseret Livestock land), ((didn't he?"
A. Well, Ira Sharp told me to let my sheep go
in those grease woods and have them killed."
To this same effect, Joseph H. Dayton, one of the
sheep herders of defendants, testified to a conversation
with Mr. Moss of the Deseret Livestock Company in 1930,
and on Page 312 of the transcript the following appears:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~~

21

HQ.

What did Mr. Moss say to you?

A. Mr. Moss came out and told me, he says, ci
thought I told you to stay below the road.' I says,
(That's right.' He says, cHow is it you are not below the road?'
A. I said, ci have got a lot of sore-footed sheep,
and I have got to try to get them along and take
them on into Timpie,' and I said, ci have got to
go where I can take them along the best.' "
~~

c

On Page 315 he says that Mr. Moss answered:
that's all right, go ahead."

ccWell,

On Page 315 also Mr. Dayton states as follows:

'I
,, ...

'""

ccAnd you would usually have some excuse of that kind
to give to Mr. Moss-

•

lllm

A. That's correct.

Not always, I didn't."

The defendant Sharp in his testimony further emphasizes the fact that the defendants and intervener never
claimed or asserted a right to trail over any of the lands
of the Deseret Livestock Company, and Sharp at Page 348
states:
ccA. Yes. Mr. Moss said, when I told him that I
was out there with the Howells Livestock interest, he said, cwell, I would like you, when you go
through the country north, to go below the road.'

Q. What did you say to him in answer to that?
A. I said, cMr. Moss, we have men along with
the sheep company who have been over the trail
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and know the trail, and they go as they have always
done.' "
At Page 316 Mr. Dayton states:
uQ. The camp wagon would follow along the
county road, and the sheep would follow up in
different paths so as to get the better feed?
A. Yes sir."
On Page 277 Mr. J. Earl Palmer, a district grazer
called as a witness for the defendants, states that he has
been in the Skull Valley area supervising the trailing of
sheep for ten years, and at this page he states that throughout all of those ten years the camp wagons of the Howell
sheep were seen by him in each of the years, and in response
to the question, uwhere would they tr.flvel", he answered:
ttA. Along the road.
Q. That's the present county road?
A. That's where I have seen them, yes sir.
Q. You have never seen them traveling any
place except on that road?

A. No."
Witness Peter A. Jensen, who was the foreman of the
defendants' sheep operation, testifies at Page 342 as follows:
uA. No. I sighted Bill along the trail, along
the highway.
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Q. Now, when we speak of the highway, that
is the road that is traveled down through the
country?
A. That is the county road, I guess they call it.

Q. And there is only one county road out there,
isn't there?
A. Ye5."
And at Page 343 of the transcript:

uQ. Now, When you and Mr. Sorensen were
speaking about roads, it was about that county
road, wasn't it?
A. About the county road?
below the road.

He said to keep

Q. And when you speak about-when he mentioned keep below the road, there was only one
road that you had in mind and that was that
county road, wasn't it?
A. That was the county road.

Q. So when you speak of the road in Skull Valley it is that county road?
A. Yes.

Q. And that's the road that all of the public
travel?
A. That's the road."
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At Page 344 Jensen states:
ttQ. Your wagons always follow this county
road?
A. They come along the road and then-are
going from the ranch out south?

Q. Yes.

*

*

*'

ttQ. All the wagons follow the road until they
get down to Brown's Ranch. Is that it?
A. Yes, or near to Brown's Ranch.

Q. Now, and this has been a constant practice
since 1929?
A. Yes, that's the way our camp wagons went."
At Page 351 Jensen states:
ttA. Well, we go along the trail.

Q. Now, when you say the trailA. Along East of the road we would travel
right along.

Q. That's the county road that you mentioned?
A. Yes."
At Page 352:

J'

This Foreman Jensen also at Page 353 of the transcript, on redirect examination states:
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uA. Yes, they get all the way from a half to a
mile and a half, I guess.

Q. From where, from the road?
A. From the road, yes, from the road some
places, some places a little farther.

Q. Did you ever get up into the foothills to
the east?
A. Not too far up.

Q. So they stayed between the county road on
the west and the foothills in the east?
A. Yes, what you would call the foothills. You
see it varies."
And explain this, at Page 354 he states: uSome places
they would be right to the foothills and other times they
wouldn't be to the foothills."
Milton B. Cannon, one of the witnesses for defendants,
states that he was employed by the old Neff Brothers Land
& Livestock Company at the time Mr. Howells became
interested until the name was changed in 1932, his experience commencing in December, 1925. At Page 295 of the
transcript Cannon was testifying to a conversation he had,
the exact date of which is not given. This is the purported
conversation:

ceQ. Which side of that road did they want you
to keep your sheep on?
A. They tried to keep us to the west of the
road.
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Q. What did you say to Mr. Moss when he told
you to keep them below that road?
A. We used to just pass the buck, pass the burk
to the foreman and to somebody else.

Q. You didn't tell him that, did you, that you
were trying to pass the buck?
A. No.
Q. What did you tell him?
A. I told him the foreman was in charge of
the trailing of the sheep and I would report it
to him.

Q. Did you move your sheep down below the
road?
A. I gave no orders to the sheep men at all.

Q. And where did they trail?
A. They trailed along the road or to the left
of the road, particularly the left. Usually I could
find them on the left of the road."
Speaking of the directions he had received from the
Deseret Livestock Company, at Page 296 of the transcript Mr. Cannon further states:
ttA. They always told us the same story, that
they owned Skull Valley practically and that we ~ 1 1
were trespassing and should keep the sheep below
the road an d rai Iroa d them through. It was a ~
hazing process with them. I ordered them as much :lc
as we could."
~~
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The principal part of the foregoing statement of facts
has been inserted to indicate to the court a general type of
testimony as to the purported location of the trail as
indicated by the witnesses for the defendants and interveners. Also the fact that, as they went through that
territory, they were always trailing to some point north
or south, and to indicate that there was never any definition by any wheel track or other evidence on the ground
as to the trail, leaving the entire matter one of conjecture.
Typifying the fact that the road or trail was neve·r identified and that its very existence was also in dispute is the
following statement made by Judge Ellett, as it appears
at page 522 of the transcript, wherein the Judge denied
the interveners' motion for a continuance for the purpose
of permitting a survey of a road or trail:
uThe difficulty with that is going to be this, that
if you survey a straight line through and take all
these witnesses out there, I may have every one of
them disagreeing at some point with that trail. If I
give you a trail, I ought to do it on the theory that
I find where it goes, and the witnesses may let me
down. Wherever I survey one, they will say, cit
wasn't here. It was down there.'"
STATEMENT OF POINTS

_....

.~

~m•

I. The description of the claimed roadway, trail and
water right at Burnt Springs in the Complaint in Intervention and Cross Complaint of defendants is so indefinite
and conflicting as to be subject to a general demurrer and
specia1 demurrer.
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2. There was no evidence introduced or pleadings to

support Findings, and no Findings to support the decree
from which the Court could decree either a public road or
a private easement.
3. There was no evidence, pleading or finding from

which the court could find a prescriptive easement at
Burnt Springs in favor of intervener.
4. The easement in gross which the court decreed to

intervenor is excessive and so indefinite that as a matter
of law the judgement should be set aside. This statement
applies to the area at Burnt Springs as well as the other
points, and includes the further proposition that there
was no evidence to sustain an easement in gross.
5. The· lands, the title to which was in the state of
Utah, and being purchased under contract with the state
of Utah by Jeremy and leased from Jeremy by the Deseret
Stock Company, could not be subject to prescriptive easement.
6. Lands the patent to which has been issued from

the United States or the state of Utah for less than twenty
years could not be subject to a prescriptive easement.
7. The intervener could not by lease or assignment to
the Sharps permit them to use or acquire any eastment in
gross in favor of intervenor, and the court erred in dismissing the trespass as to the defendants Sharp.
8. The attempt of the court by findings and judgment to establish title in intervener to lands in three states
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and various counties, and permitting a tacking to establish an easement in gross, is in error, as an easement in gross
cannot be transferred by a transfer of land.
9. The court erred in permitting intervener to survey

and introduce in evidence a survey of a purported road
after the case had been tried and submitted, and which
survey does not follow any course testified to by any
witness in the trial of the case.
10. The court erred in decreeing that the water of

Burnt Springs were public and subject to appropriation,
and that plaintiff had no title, appropriation or ownership
to the waters of the spring for the reason that plaintiff had
not put in issue its title to the waters, and defendants and
interveners on their failure to establish a right could not
have plaintiff's right adjudicated.
11. The court erred in decreeing the right of intervener to trail and graze its sheep over all of Section 3 6,
Township 2 South, Range 8 West, and Section 2, Township 3 South, Range 8 West as there was no evidence to
sustain any finding or judgement for such easement.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
THE DESCRIPTION OF THE CLAIMED ROADWAY AND TRAIL AND RIGHT TO WATER
AT BURNT SPRINGS IN THE COMPLAINT
IN INTERVENTI ON AND CROSS-COMPLAINT
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OF DEFENDANTS IS SO INDEFINITE AND
CONFLICTING AS TO BE SUBJECT TO A
GENERAL DEMURRER AND SPECIAL DEMURRER
As will appear at Pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the record,
this action was filed April 28, 1947. The cross-complaint
was filed January 21, 1948, and the complaint in intervention was filed June 3, 1948. The cause came on to be
heard July 15, 1948. Time for pleading to the complaint
in intervention had been extended by counsel and demurrers, both special and general, together with answers were
served and filed July 12, 1948, the day before the matter
came on for trial, and on the date of trial the demurrers
were submitted to the Court, with the request that the
claimed easements, whether public or private, and their
exact boundaries, be required to be definitely set forth by
the defendants and intervener. The Court denied the
demurrers, permitting the filing only of the general demurrer and denying of special demurrers as untimely, and
refusing to require the defendants and cross-complaint
more specifically to set forth the exact boundaries of their
claimed right-of-way. (Tr. P. 5)
At the time the motion was submitted to the Court
the complaint in intervention alleged that the intervener
had appropriated and used the waters of Burnt Springs, and
that intervener and its predecessors-in-interest had for more
than fifty years used a well-defined trail and roadway in
common with other members. of the public, with the center
line of said trail and roadway indicated by a dotted line
on their ((Exhibit C" as having a definite point of com-
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mencement on the north but no termination on the south,
and running generally through certain sections in southeasterly and southwesterly directions. It also alleged the
trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs and that ttsaid trail and
roadway and the water at and from said Burnt Springs
for more than fifty years * * * have been used and appropriated by the intervener and its prede,cessors, and such
use has been open, notorious and adverse." (Par. 14 and 15
of complaint in intervention.)
Paragraph 17 of the complaint in intervention alleges that the trail and roadway and Burnt Spring were in
existence at the time plaintiff's lands were public domain,
and the trail and roadway was a public highway, was
used by the public generally for trailing sheep; and also
Burnt Spring was used prior to the Federal conveyance in
1900 of these lands to the State of Utah, and that the
trail and roadway and the right to the use of the waters
of Burnt Spring were all reserved and excepted from the
grants to the State of Utah by the federal government,
and were likewise reserved when the State of Utah conveyed to the plaintiff.
The cross-complaint of defendants Sharp set forth
the same allegations, definitely alleging that the use of the
trail and roadway and Burnt Springs was by the public
and was used by the defendants Sharp as members of the
public, with the trail as a public trail and Burnt Springs
as a public watering hole.
We submit that the Court erred in denying the demurrers to require the defendants and intervener to defi ~-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

nitely describe the boundaries of the claimed easements
and should have required them to definitely state what
they claimed and whether they claimed as public or private easements.
In the case of Sullivan v. Candas, 7 6 Utah, S8 S; 290
Pac. 954, our Court at Page 590 of the Utah Reports
states:
uwhere it is sought to have it decreed that a person's realty is subject to a use or easement in favor
of another, it must be described in the pleadings
with such certainty as to enable the defendant to
definitely know what portion is so claimed, and
that the judgment establishing the valadity of a
claim to use or easements in land must be definite
and certain as to the property affected. * * * a
right of way which is too indefinite for a determinate description, cannot be established and protected.
::· * :-,. the complaint must describe so as to show the
nature, extent and location of the right claimed in
order that a definite decree may be entered. ::- * *
The propositions may well be conceded." (Italics
ours)
Throughout the entire trial of this case the pleadings
remained as heretofore set forth without amendment or
de·finition; in fact, near the conclusion of the trial, at
Page 521 of the transcript, the attorneys for defendants
and intervener made a motion to the court for a continuance for the purpose of permitting them to have a survey
made of the roadway or trail, whichever the Court should
find. This motion was made after the Court had taken
a view of the valley (Tr. SOl).
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At Page 522 of the transcript, Judge Ellet, in denying
the request of counsel, states:
uThe difficulty with that is going to be this, that
if you survey a straight line through and take
these witnesses out there, I may have every one of
them disagreeing at some point with that trail. If
I give you a trail, I ought to do it on the theory that
I find where it goes, and the witnesses may let me
down. Wherever I survey one, they will say, (It
wasn't here. It was down there.'"

·~

-

In the case of Sullivan v. Condas, supra, at Page 591,
the Court states that the claim of the defendant was not
to a private easement, privilege or advantage, but was a
public highway. The Court indicated that the defendant
by his counterclaim was required to describe the highway
said to be adjudged a private highway, insofar as it affects
plaintiff's lands, with such reasonable certainty as to
identify it and to fully apprise the plaintiff is. particularity
the manner in which their lands were to be affected by the
location of the highway.

In the Sullivan case the plaintiffs themselves de": scribed a roadway in their complaint that indicated it was
~ a private road for the convenience of the plaintiffs, and
~ in this connection the Court states:
((There thus was no issue as to the identity of
the roadway or as to its course and distance, so far
as it affected the lands of the plaintiffs. What in
such respect divided the parties was as to whether
the roadway was a private way or a public highway.
There thus was in the counterclaim a sufficient gen-
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eral description of the roadway which fairly apprized the plaintiffs of the location of it sought to
to be adjudged a public highway and the lands of the
plaintiffs affected thereby, to admit evidence with
respect thereto. In such circumstances the complaint made by the plaintiffs does not so much involve what they call substance, but an imperfect
description, one requiring a great particularity or
to be made more specific or certain, which, if such
defect existed, was required to be called in question
by a special demurrer."
Alton H. Sorenson, a civil engineer and witness for
defendants, at Page 13 3 of the record, states:
uThere really are three roads discernible: one
east of the existing county road; that is, when I say
(the existing county road', I mean the present main
county road, so that we get the same picture.
At Page 142 Mr. Sorenson marked this road with
crosses as the road claimed by the defendants as the old
county road.

I
~

.~

Witness Neff, in his deposition at Page 83, stated
that this line or road as marked by Sorenson was not the
old road that he had in mind.
Sharp, one of the defendants, outlined with further
crosses the same course as indicated by Sorenson on what
he (Sharp) thought was the road.
In his testimony, at Pages 605 and 606 of the transcript, Edward Clyde, attorney for defendants, states
that it was his understanding the dotted line shown on
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their HExhibit C" was the road marked on the aerial.photo
with the crosses and circles (Defendants' Exhibit 5), and
at Page 606 Mr. Clyde further states that the road so
marked on the aerial photo on Exhibit C is not the road
that was surveyed and found by the court in its total.
Clyde admits he does not know where it differs.
Witness Richards, who surveyed the purported road
found by the Court, at Page 627 indicates that for better
than a half mile he surveyed a course following the stakes
and states: ((During part of that distance the road was
visible but the good part of it we just followed stakes,"
further explaining that when he said Hroad" it would be
just wheel tracks in the grass.
We submit that the pleadings are entirely too indefinite to sustain any decree or judgment or state a cause
of action for the definition of either a public or private
easement; and further submit that the definition in the
pleading of a right-of-way as a public or as a private
eastment is so inconsistent as to make the complaint subject to a general demurrer.
The pleadings as they now stand set forth that there
is a public trail or roadway through this upper area; that
it has been used by intervener and defendants as a public
road or trail over the objections of plaintiff; and the Court,
after the case had been tried and resubmitted, permitted
an amendment to allow the intervener to set up a claim
to a private easement to trail and graze lands over an area
of two miles, following, nevertheless, this same public
trail or roadway.
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In the case of Bertolina v. Fra.tes, 89 Utah, 238; 57
Pac. (2d) 346, at Page 250 of the Utah Reports, the Court
states:
((The public was not a party to the litigation.
There is nothing to indicate in the pleadings or in
the findings any dedication to the use of the public
or any grant to the public. Such right, if established, would conflict with the prescriptive right
pleaded by defendants."
It is submitted, therefore, in the above argument that
a party in its pleading setting forth that a roadway or
trail is a public and a prive easement asserts such a
conflicting right as not to state a cause of action. The
trail or roadway must be held public or private; it cannot
be both.

It is further submitted that the description of the
purported trail or roadway being a disputed and contested
fact-first, is that as between plaintiff and interveners
and defendants it is contended that there is no such roadway, and second, that as among the witnesses for the defendants and interveners the locations of the roadway or
trail was conflicting-the interveners and defendants
must definitely describe the trail and roadway so as to
fully and completely advise the plaintiff where the same
would be located. A failure to do this constitutes a
failure to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action
and to subject the complaint to a general demurrer, and
the court erred in failing to sustain that general demurrer.
Under the authority of the Sullivan v. Condas case,
supra the court definitely erred in failing to sustain the
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special demurrer of the plaintiff in which special demurrer
plaintiff requested the court to require the defendants
and interveners to more definitely describe the course of
the claimed road or trail and to set forth whether they
claimed the trail and road were public or private. Definitely the court erred in refusing to consider the pleadings
so submitted and in arbitrarily striking the special demurrer.
POINT NO. II.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD DECREE
EITHER A PUBLIC ROAD OR A PRIVATE
EASEMENT.
A reading of the transcript from pages 40 through
48 will disclose to the court the background under which
counsel for plaintiff and defendants entered into a stipulation, as the same appears at page 44 and 45 of the transcript. In this stipulation it was agreed that the plaintiff
was the owner and had the possessory right of all of the
lands described in the complaint, as fee owner and lessee,
subject to any limitation that the patents put upon those
lands. Mr. Clyde at Page 44 states:
((We are willing to stipulate that they own the
interest in these lands as the fee owner, subject, however, to any limitations that the patents put on.
That's the reason we want them in."
The Court: ((All right."
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The limitation provided by the patents is incorporated in the record as it appears at page 45 of the transcript,
and subjects the lands to any easement or right of way of
the public to use all such highways as may have been established according to law under the same or any part thereof.
At page 46 of the transcript Mr. Clyde asked the court
to take judicial notice that, as to the lands upon which
patent had not issued, the patent when issued would contain this same limitation. At page 41 of the transcript
Mr. Clyde stated:

HI don't admit and never will that you own the
complete fee in total, complete from easements,
because all your patents have reservation of easement in them."
At Page 45 the court stated:
Isn't this a fact, that the patents just say csubject to all trails and rights-of-way that may have
been established'?

'~

Mr. Clyde: ((Yes."
The Court: ((Can't you stipulate to that, and you have
got to prove your trails and rights-of-way anyway?"
Mr. Clyde: uThat is the only reason I want them in."

::~

(11

The Court: Hyour patent will not specify any trail by
meters and bounds."
Mr. Clyde: uThat's right."
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The record, therefore, stands with a stipulation between the plaintiff, the interveners and defendants that
the plaintiff is the owner in fee and as lessee on all of the
lands set forth in the complaint subject only to such highways as could be established under the reservations contained in the patents. Throughout all of the trial the
pleadings and the stipulation between plaintiff and defendants limited any right claimed by the defendants and
interveners to such trail or roadway as they could establish under the reservations in the patents.
At the outset of this argument, therefore, we submit
that any attempt on the part of the interveners and defendants and the court to permit or recognize any private
easement at any point was entirely inconsistent and contrary to the stipulation entered into by the parties, and
an attempt to vary a solemn agreement between counsel
before the court as to what the various clai~ were. Any
use of any purported trail or roadway through this country
which could in any way be identified with any trail or
roadway claimed to be reserved by the patents would be
material, and the attempt subsequently of interveners and
defendants and the court to take such testimony for the
purpose of establishing a private easement contrary to this
stipulation of counsel was gross error, and deprived plaintiff at any time during this trial of protecting itself by
proof or cross examination.
This case proceeded to trial on the pleadings of defendents as shown by their cross-complaint, and intervener as indicated by its complaint in intervention. In
the cross-complaint the Sharps state their rights to go
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over the lands owned and leased by plaintiff as being a
right in common with the public.
Paragraph 12 of the cross-complaint states that the
cross-complainants and Howells Livestock, Inc., and their
predecessors-in-interest, have for over fifty years used a
well-defined trail and roadway in common with other
members of the public, which trail is in excess of 150 feet
wide. In Paragraph 13 of the cross-complaint they allege
that the trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs, and that the
trail and roadway and water at and from Burnt Springs
have been used by the cross-complainants and Howells
Livestock, Inc., and their predecessors-in-interest and the
public for stock-watering purposes.
Paragraph 15 of the cross-complaint alleges that the
trail and roadway and Burnt Springs were in existence
when the lands of plaintiff were public domain, and that
the trail and roadway at that time was a public highway
and used by the public generally for trailing sheep, and
the waters of Burnt Springs were used for watering of
livestock, and that the Federal Government conveyed the
lands to the State of Utah, subject to the right of the
public to use the trail and roadway, and subject to the
right of the public to use the waters of Burnt Springs for
watering livestock, and that when the State of Utah conveyed to plaintiff the lands were conveyed, subject to the
use by the public of the highway, and subject to the right
of the public to use the waters of Burnt Springs.
The complaint in intervention in Paragraph 13 claims
that Howells Livestock, Inc., and its predecessors-in-inter-
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est have driven their sheep through this country twice a
year, trailing them for a distance of several hundred miles.
In Paragraph 14 the intervener alleges that in making
this spring and fall trail it has used a well-defined trail and
roadway in common with other members of the public,
the center line of the trail and roadway being described
as heretofore set forth in this brief.
In Paragraph 17 the intervener again sets forth that
the trail and roadway, when created, was upon public
domain, and at that time the trail and roadway was a
public highway and used by the public generally for the
purpose of trailing sheep; that when the lands in Burnt
Springs area were conveyed to the· State of Utah by the
United States, they were subject to the trail and roadway
and the right of the public to water at Burnt Springs, and
that when the lands were conveyed by the State of Utah to
plaintiff, they were likewise subject to this public right.
This was the state of the pleadings throughout all of
the trial up to and including the time the parties rested
their case on July 16, 1948. Following the trial of the
case and the submission to the Court, the parties submitted
their briefs to the Court upon the record and pleadings
then before the Court. Following this, and three months
subsequent thereto, the intervener was permitted, over the
objection of plaintiff, to amend its complaint in intervention and reopen its case to admit further testimony as to
a survey of an entirely different road, which the Judge had
himself determined.
The amendment was to the effect that intervener and
its predecessors-in-interest had used all of the property of
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plaintiff between the new county road and the foothills to
the east for trailing and grazing their sheep on said property
from Timpie Point to the losepa Ranch, and that the claim
to this use had been since 1911, and that by the use of the
property and grazing of the forage, intervener has acquired an easement in gross to trail across the property
and the right to graze 14,000 of its sheep on the property
while trailing across the same between the county road
and the foothills.
We submit that the court and counsel having proceeded to a trial consuming a week in July of 1948, in
which the only issue was whether there was a public trial
and roadway through this country, and the case having
been tried and submitted to the court on that theory, the
Court could not subsequently permit an amendment setting forth a private easement in intervener. We submit
that any such an amendment was not timely; that it
brought in an entirely new and different cause of action
and issues upon which the plaintiff was entitled to have
time in which to raise and plead issues and produce testimony.
It is submitted as a general principle of law that
neither an individual nor the public can acquire an easement generally through a country. We have involved in
the decree of the Court the granting of a prescriptive right
to intervener of a trail approximately 3000 feet in width,
extending from the grease woods on the west to the foothills on the east and along the general course of a road.
That road does not exist on the ground and is not marked,
except as some ancient wagon tracks will appear at one
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or two points in the course of fifteen miles, and this prescriptive right so granted is certainly violative of the above
principle and could not in more explicit words violate the
above principle, because it actually uses the words ((general course."
Not only is the right given to trail the sheep but the
Court gives the intervener the right to graze all of this
land, giving it a profit a prendre. Not only that, but the
Court extends this private easement for a width of two
miles by giving to intervener the right to trail and graze
its sheep over all of Section 36, Township 2 South, Range
8 West, and all of Section 2, Township 3 South, Range
8 West.
In support of this purported public road and private
easement the following is submitted as an analysis of all
of the evidence introduced by defendants and intervener
for the establishment of this purported trail.
As to the light streak appearing in the aerial photographs of defendants (their Exhibit 5) , and which has
been identified on the exhibit by the defendant Sharp and
his engineer Sorensen as to what they thought appeared
to be a road and by Sharp as to a trail he thought his sheep
had followed in the ten years' experience he had had, Sam
Neff the defendants and interveners, principal witness at
Page 8 3 of his deposition states:

nQ. But that wouldn't be this main upper road
that you were referring to?
A. It probably isn't because I know the upper
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road came out here and took a bend down to the
stream."
This was referring to the area in Section 29 and 32,
Township 2 South, Range 7 West.
The witness Samuel Neff had been in Skull Valley
since prior to 1900 and had formed the corporation into
which the intervener subsequently purchased. In his
entire deposition he did not specify that he had at any
time operated sheep in any particular section of land. Never at any time does he indicate that his sheep would have
been in Section 36, Township 2 South, Range 8 West, or
in Section 2 South, Range 8 West. Neff's testimony at
Page 9 of his deposition is that when he had 6000 sheep
he had two bands, and that when he had 20,000 sheep he
had seven bands, but he never indicated for how long a
period or during what period he had the various number
of bands.
Describing at Page 10 the course they took, he said,
they were ((taking a southerly direction from the Point of
the Mountain to the spring." This same witness Neff, as
appears on Page 15, had entirely lost his recollection as to
the roads, for he was under the impression that the old
lower road was the new county road, and at Page 15 of his
deposition he states that the lower main road was turnpiked. He said their wagons would always follow the
lower road except when it was muddy.
At Page 17 of his deposition Neff states that the
course they took was practically always above the main
highway.
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At Page 18 of his deposition Neff says, ualways up
until 1926, we just trailed through there any place. We
didn't restrict them to any certain point, but we followed
the general direction each year." In describing the width
of the course they would have taken through the country,
Neff indicates they may have covered at various times two
miles.
Again at Page 19, when he was asked if he kept his
sheep east of the old lower highway, Neff said, ((Yes,
usually."
Neff at another time described a course that the
road took throughout this purported distance between
Timpie and the plaintiff's ranch at Iosepa, merely indicating that it was adjacent to the old highway and constituted
a turn-out in bad weather.
At Page 29 of the deposition Neff stated that at no
time in the history of his operation did anyone interfere
with him or tell him not to trail through the area.
At Page 34 Neff states that this same trail that he had
used was likewise used by the Stillmans, John Y. Smith, the
Browns, the W rathalls and the Eleasons. The history of
this use commenced in 18 9 3.
At Page 40 Neff states that as they would get near
the area of Deep Spring the trail would be farther away
from the east mountains than it was toward Timpie Point,
stating, uoh, yes; considerably farther away."
At Page 41, when his attention was directed to markings on the aerial photo, N elf stated they did not hold
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them to a line; spread them out as far as it was convenient
for them to travel.
At Page 42, Neff states that in the area of Deep
Spring, .. we went right south and covered any territory

there that we cared to."
At Page 73 of the deposition, and pages immediately
prior and following, Neff indicates the course he followed
with his sheep for the years he was connected with the
operation from Summit County to Skull Valley, indicating many streams and springs where the sheep would water,
and indicates that he had never claimed he had appropriated water at any of these points.
At Page 75 Neff states, (~I don't think we ever conveyed any water rights."
There is nothing in the entire testimony of Neff to
indicate that he had been taken out over any purported
old road now in existence, and indicated that was the
road he had in mind. The only thing we have is the fact
that the light line marked by crosses by defendants and
intervener's witnesses is stated by Neff not to be the road.
As appears from Neff's testimony at Page 84, there is
nothing on the map or on the ground to indicate the point
where the old road went.
At Page 8 5 Neff states that the only purpose of this
purported upper road was as a turn-out when the weather
was bad and the road was soft and impassable.
At Page 87 Neff indicates as follows:
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uQ.

And your sheep would be grazing throughout that whole valley, and that would be one of
the watering places?
A. Yes."
In his deposition Neff states that from the time they
came to Tooele County they were actually in their grazing
area.
At Page 92 Neff indicates that they were grazing over
Skull Valley and that would be any point on the east or
west side, but he states they never grazed their sheep on
either the west or east side, north of the range at losepa,
but at Page 93 states that, nevertheless, they went into
the valley wherever they thought their sheep would get
the best feed, and that from the time they got around
Timpie Point they would scatter them over a two-mile
area or more, whatever was necessary to see that they had
feed.
Other witnesses called by intervener to establish its
case included the following:
Pharis Johnson, at Page 146 of the transcript, states,
that there was a higher road because he followed it.
At Page 149 of the transcript he states that they
would go up and make a gradual curve and then generally
south and get to Burnt Springs and then south to Salt
Mountain. He answered that this trail could be through
grease wood now, because of the changed conditions, as
he had not been out there since 1920, and it would all de-
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pend on where the said grease wood was, so far as Johnson
was concerned. (Tr. 158)
He states on Page 162 of the transcript that the upper highway merged with the old lower road in places.
At Page 173 the witness Johnson states that all of the
herds in the valley used the same territory. This included
sheep of the Deseret Livestock Company as well as Neff,
and particularly would he see the sheep of the Deseret Livestock Company along the mountains.
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Jasper Brown, one of the old sheepmen of the area,
called by defendants and intervener, stated that this upper
road went forty miles, or the full length of Skull Valley,
and that all of the sheep of all of the operators trailed in
the same general course. He was also one of the many
sheep operators that watered the sheep at Burnt Springs
as he went there. His only recollection of the road was
that the sheep trailed the upper road near the mountain.

j~

j

Paul E. Wrathall, a witness called by defendants,
stated that the only place he had seen sheep trail was along
the foothills on the east side of the valley (Tr. 207). He
stated that his only knowledge of the upper road was that
it came in at Burnt Springs, and that they never took the
upper road at Burnt Springs unless they had to.
William E. Mathews, a witness called by defendants,
stated that there were 75,000 to 100,000 sheep trailing
through there, as is indicated by his testimony at Page 213.
At Page 214 he states that the herds usually held to the
foothills, but not so much in the fall.
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At Page 214 he states that he has seen sheep along the
lower road.
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At Page 218 he mentions the number of

opera tors who followed this same trail.
Joseph Stillman at Page 223 indicates that a number
of operators ran their sheep in Skull Valley, and at Page
225 of the transcript he states that all of these operators
followed the same general course along a high road, and
that the high road he was speaking of ran along the lower
edge of this trail near the grease woods. This appears definitely from his testimony at Page 227, and at Page 230 he
states that this was the trail he followed with Neff and
that he and Neff trailed it side by side.
At Page 238 of the transcript it appears that he and
Neff followed the same course.
Earl Palmer, a grazer, stated that though all of his
experience in Skull Valley, extending over ten years, he
had never seen any of the sheep wagons following any
course other than the present county road.
Milton D. Cannon, a witness for defendants and intervener, states that his history with Skull Valley commenced in the spring of 1926. At Page 295 he states that
the sheep trailed along the road or left of the road, and
this road is indicated as the present county road. He testified to conversations he had had with Moss, who was then
Manager of the Deseret Livestock Company, and when
told by Moss to keep off their land, at Page 295 Cannon
states, HWe used to just pass the buck, pass the buck to the
foreman and to somebody else." ((I told him the foreman
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was in charge of the trailing of the sheep and I would report it to him."
At Page 296 he states that Moss told them to get
through the territory as fast as they could and that he
(Cannon) , in order to meet the demands of Moss in getting the sheep through there as fast as he could, states, ul
ordered them as much as we could."
At Page 305 Cannon states that the only road they
ever traveled was the present county highway.
Joseph H. Dayton, called as a witness by defendants
and intervener, states at Page 216 that the camp wagons
would follow the present county road and the sheep
would go along the side of the road. When Moss told
Dayton to keep his sheep off the upper side of the road,
Dayton told him he had some sore footed animals and that
Moss told him under the circumstances it was all right.
Peter A. Jensen, a witness called for defendants and
intervener, stated that his history with the operation commenced in 1929, and, as appears at Page 326, of the transcript, most of the sheep went through east of the main
road.
At Page 3 31 he states: ((When we get past Burnt
Springs, then we keep up, and then that road, when you
get north, I guess it would be directly north, some say
north, it circles up. Then we would come right around
up and stay, and the sheep would go along that-along
east of it and along around Timpie Point."
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At Page 3 34 Jensen states that they would go through
from eight to nine miles a day in the spring, and at Page
344 he states that all of the wagons followed the present
county road down from Iosepa Point, and that it had been
a constant practice to do so since 1929.
In describing at Pages 3 52, 3 53 and 3 54 the course the
sheep would have taken in answer to the question as to
whether they would cover the distance east of the road
as much as two miles, Jensen answered, ((Sometimes, maybe." When asked what would be the east line of the trail
he answered, ((Well, they get all the way from a half to
a mile and a half, I guess." When asked if they ever get
out into the foothills he answered, ((Not too far up." Then
he concluded at Page 3 54 by stating, ((And in some places
they would be right by the foothills, and other times they
wouldn't be to the foothills."
Jack Clark, a witness for defendants and intervener,
at Page 3 69 states, ((Well, I always trailed just along above
the greasewoods and east of the road."
Again at Page 370 Clark states, eel traveled the road
just above the greasewoods."
At Page 373 Clark states, that the camp wagon followed the road all the way up.
Ira Sharp, one of the defendants, states that the
course his sheep followed was the course marked on Defendants' Exhibit 5 by crosses and was the only road they
had ever followed.
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At Page 402 Sharp states that the trail should be a
half to a mile wide, and at Page 403 he states, ((We never
spread our sheep wider than this as we go through there."
We have outlined above all of the testimony that was
presented by defendants and intervener as to the road, as
to the trial and as to any prescriptive right they claim. The
distance of the foothills at any point is not given; there
is no indication as to how far west and how far east; there
is no indication that there is any way to determine what
the boundaries would be. There is no indication that the
greasewood itself has increased in its growth and modified
and changed old trails. There is no indication that storms
have changed and modified the entire area. There is no
indication that erosion has changed the entire area.
In describing the course .he followed in making the
survey of this purported old road as determined by the
Court, Surveyor Richards at Page 626 states:

((Q. As you proceed then south from Timpie
Point, there was some road that you followed?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, where did it disappear and you start
to survey a line only by stake? * * *
A. For 670 feet we followed a road. The :first
stake was located 670 feet from the beginning
point."
And at Page 627 of the transcript the witness states:

((Q. It would appear from your notes then for
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a distance of 3,000 feet that you followed stakes
only and no road. Is that correct?
A. During part of the distance the road was
visible, but the good part of it we just followed
stakes.

Q. When you say a road was visible, was it other
than just tire track or wheel track in the grass?
A. No. It was just wheel tracks in the dirt."
A summary, therefore, of this testimony discloses
that at no time has any witness identified the road claimed
by defendants and intervener as the purported old road
which the old-timers state was traveled sometime prior
to 1920.
The witness Neff states that the road marked by the
crosses is not the old road he had in mind. The fact that
sheep have gone generally through the country over an
area several miles in width which the owner of the land
himself has used historically as a trail and grazing area
certainly will not support any :fiinding or decree wherein
the Court arbitrarily sets a course for a purported road.
The fact that witnesses stated there was a road within an
area several miles in width certainly does not permit the
Court then to arbitrarily assign a purported course for
that road.
So that this Court can appreciate the factual background in connection with the purported upper righ road,
as found by Judge Ellett, we refer the Court at this point
to the series of pictures introduced by plaintiff.
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Plaintiff's Exhibit B IS a picture showing the purported take-off for the upper high road at Timpie Point.
Particularly do we call the Court's attention to the various
trails or tracks or purported roads branching off into the
gravel bed, where the testimony shows material was secured for the construction of Highway 40 in the area of
the Stansbury Range. To the right of the picture can be
seen the trail taking off down through the brush. Tracks
are seen also running in a southeasterly direction through
the center of the picture.
Exhibit C shows another branch road or trail taking
off through the right of the picture, and Exhibit Cis taken at a point where the road disappears in the center of
Exhibit B.
Exhibit D shows the end of the branch road taking off
to the left in Exhibit C, and is only a short distance south
and east of the point where the picture in Exhibit C was
taken,-the large cedars being easily identifiable in both
Exhibits C and D.
Exhibit E shows another branch taking off from the
trail which appears headed towards the right-hand side of
Exhibit C.
Exhibit F is a picture taken with the camera facing to
the west, showing a road coming up into the second gravel
pit near Timpie Point.
Exhibit G shows yet another fork or trail taking off
from the fork of the road shown in Exhibit E.
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Exhibit H is another illustration of the same point
shown in Exhibit G.
Exhibit I is taken with the camera facing west and
is a short distance south of the point from which Exhibit
H was taken, and in the right background appears Lone
Peak referred to in the evidence. In this picture appears
another fork from one of the roads.
Exhibit J is a picture taken a short distance south,
showing the end of the trail, track or road appearing in
the left of Exhibit I.
Exhibit K is taken with the camera facing directly
south at the same point from which Exhibit J is taken,
being the end of that fork of the road, showing the rocky,
rugged country up toward the foothills, and with no indication of any continuance of a road.
Exhibit Lis taken with the camera focused in a northwesterly direction, looking back on the same part of the
area shown in Exhibit K.
Plaintiff's Exhibit P is taken with the camera focused
to the west at a point twenty or thirty yards south of the
area where Exhibit I was taken, showing Cedar Mountain
in the background and Lone Peak in the upper left portion
of the picture. Counsel is standing on the fork appearing
at the right in Exhibit I, and the camera is focused on the
left-hand fork of Exhibit I.
Exhibit M is a photograph showing the county road
running south through Skull Valley from Timpie Point.
At a point in the center of the picture, to the left of the
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first telephone pole, is the point where the track, trail or
road, which is the right-hand fork shown in Exhibit I,
comes into the county highway.
Exhibit N is a picture of the present county road,
with the camera focused north at the point where Exhibit
M is taken, illustrating another of the branch trails or
take-off tracks shown in previous exhibits. This point is
approximately one mile south of Timpie Point. In the right
center of this picture can be seen the gravel bed and road
leading in to it.
Exhibit 0, with the penciled figures ((P2-8" on the
back, illustrates the old lower highway as it appeared at
the time of trial. The present county road, with its· pole
line, is seen in the left of the center, and this picture is taken a short distance south of Timpie Point.
Exhibit Q is a picture taken with the camera facing
west from a point on the county road approximately due
east of Lone Peak. This shows the old circular road coming
up from Lone Rock Peak and branching off north or south
as that road comes into the present county highway.
Exhibit R is taken at the same point on the county
highway as Exhibit Q but with the camera focused in a
northeasterly direction and showing yet another track,
trail or road being a continuation north and south of the
right-hand branch appearing in Exhibit Q.
Exhibit S illustrates a trail leading straight east from
the present county road, and is another unidentified trail,
road or track in that area.
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Exhibit Tis taken at a point on the present highway
directly east of Muskrat Springs, with the camera facing
east toward Muskrat Canyon.

This further illustrates

the country and the lack of any road or trail in that vicinity.
Exhibit U is taken from the west edge of the present
county highway looking to the northwest across Burnt
Springs, with Lone Peak in the background. The light
streak in the center of the picture represents the dam
constructed by Deseret Livestock Company for impounding and gathering the waters of the Burnt Springs area.
Exhibit Vis a picture taken with the camera facing
to the East on the present county highway and a short
distance below Muskrat Springs, indicating the road leading east up to and into Muskrat Canyon. This road may
or may not be the one indicated in plaintiff's Exhibit A,
which is the official county plat of Skull Valley.
Exhibit W is a picture taken from the present county
highway at a point 200 yards south of the point in which
the picture was taken in Exhibit V, indicating another
road leading up and into Muskrat Canyon.
Exhibit X is a picture taken in Section 23, Township
2 South, Range 7 West, with the camera facing to the

south toward what is described in the testimony as ((Big
Knoll," which point is east of Horse Shoe or Deep Spring.
This illustrates the type of country through that area, and
in the center can be seen the present county highway receding into the distance.
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This set of pictures graphically illustrates the testimony of William Sorenson, the superintendent of plaintiff's sheep operation, and others of plaintiff's witnesses, as
supported by the testimony of witnesses of defendants and
intervener that this entire area is crossed by a multitude
of tracks from sheep wagons, hunters and other users for
various purposes, which take off in different directions
through this entire area; and graphically illustrates the use
that Deseret Livestock Company, the plaintiff, has made
of its property for its own purposes and the fact that
numerous trails would be made by its own wagons and
herds while grazing and trailing its lands. None of these
various trails have ever been identified by any witness as
being the old road.
The only testimony we have in this connection is
that of Neff, who indicates that the streak appearing in
the aerial map would not be the old road he had in mind.
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the road which
the Court found is one of the roads shown in these exhibits.
The only indication we have in this connection is from the
testimony of Mr. Clyde at Page 605 of the transcript,
wherein he states that the dotted line representing the
high road in Exhibit C attached to the complaint followed
the road mar ked with crosses and circles on the aerial
photograph (defendants' Exhibit 5) . This road marked
with the crosses and circles on defendants' Exhibit 5 is
the road claimed by intervener and defendants as the purported old road, and so indicated by defendant Sharp and
marked by him and indicated by their engineer Mr. Sorenson.
At Page 606 Clyde was asked:
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((Q. Do you know whether the road as it appeared on the aerial rna p is the road that you had
surveyed?
A. I know that it isn't in its total.

Q. Do you know where it doesn't meet with the
road as claimed in your complaint?
A. I can't tell you by metes and bounds. I know
that it started out from the new county highway at
Timpe Point on the same road and that after it
went down country a distance that I would estimat~ to be between a quarter and a half mile that
the road that we had surveyed stayed high and the
roadway that appears in the aerial photograph went
low down. ::· * *

Q. Now, when you walked along the road to
put in the stakes, were there any other roads, paths,
tracks appearing in that country?
A. There were taking off from it and roads crossing it, yes sir.

Q. And would there be more than a half dozen?
A. I would say there would be."
On Page 607 Mr. Clyde indicates that the view taken
by the Court during the trial, which would have been
around July 10, 1948, was that Mr. Clyde went out and set
the stakes September 30th, two and one-half months later;
that the surveyor was not with Clyde at the time but
went out sometime subsequent to follow the stakes, and
that all of this occurred after counsel for plaintiff and
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defendants had submitted their cause and filed briefs with
the Court.
On Page 609 Mr. Clyde states that he introduced exhibits of pictures showing a road going under a fence at
Burnt Springs, which he claimed to be the road; and Mr.
Clyde further states that that picture indicated the road
as coming out of the east fence line at Burnt Springs; and
at Page 609 of the transcript Mr. Clyde further states that
the road as claimed by them, and shown in the picture
during the trial, is not the road surveyed and found by the
Court.
At Page 610 Mr. Clyde indicates that the road surveyed at Burnt Springs would vary as much as a quarter
of a mile from the road claimed by them at the time of
the trial and as shown during the trial by their evidence,
consisting of the testimony of witnesses identifying the
picture exhibited showing the road coming through a
fence.
At Page 611 the witness Clyde states that they did not
survey this purported public road beyond a point a quarter of a mile south of Burnt Springs, ((because the road
from that point on is in public domain and we were not
interested in establishing its exact location.
We submit that this status of the evidence creates
several points of law, first, as to whether the intervener
could acquire an easement in gross by following the course
which it has claimed to be a public trail. As outlined
above, the testimony of all the sheep men indicated that
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they had followed a trail or general course through this
area. The exact boundaries of that trail were never specifically identified by any of the witnesses.
Stillman indicated that he traveled alongside of Neff
and they followed the identical course. The pleadings at
the time of the trial, therefore, set forth a public trail or
road through that area, and no private easement was asserted by the parties at any time during the trial. There
was no issue before the Court during the trial of a prescriptive right for by the stipulation at Page 44 of the
transcript, the title of Plaintiff is admitted, subject only
to the highways reserved by the patents, and these must of
necessity be public highways.
In the Case of Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v.
Morgan Brothers Land & Livestock Co., 81 Utah, 317;
17 Pac. (2d) 826, at Page 318 of the Utah Report the
Court said:
((The plaintiff's evidence respecting the ongtn
and establishment of the road all plainly showed a
use by the public for fifty years or more, for the
purpose of trailing sheep and cattle, pack horses,
and camp outfits, hauling Wood, and for access to
sawmills, etc. Without variation, the plaintiff's
witnesses testified to the use of the road at all timeS
by the public generally. Some of them testified
expressly that it was recognized as and generally
understood to be a public road and used by the
public as such without objection, for many years.
Other than a use of the road by the plaintiff and its
privies, in common with the public, there was no
evidence of any particular or individual right or
claim on the part of the plaintiff.
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uwhile a public road may be established, the use
by individual persons in common with the public
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such
common use no individual person can acquire a
right by prescription as against the owner of the
fee. 19 C. J. 900; Libertini v. Schroeder, 149 Md.
484, 132 A. 64; Tress v. Pivorotto, 104 Conn. 389,
133, A. 35; Providence, F. R. & N. S. Co. v. City
of Fall River, 187 Mass. 45, 72 N. E.
In Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Utah, 23 8, 57 Pac. (2d)
346, at Page 250 of the Utah Report the Court said:
uThere is nothing to indicate in the pleadings or
in the findings any dedication to the use of the
public or any grants to the public. Such right, if
established, would conflict with the prescrip.tive
rgiht pleaded by defendants.
u (Except in some jurisdictions, it has very generally been held that as the owner of land over which
a public highway runs cannot prevent the use of
such highway by the public, it follows that a private
right of way cannot be acquired by prescription
over land used as a highway, as against the owner
of the fee. but after the discontinuance of a public highway a private right of way may be acquired
by prescription over the same route.' 19 C. J. 900,
78.
u (The right to an easement will be extinguished
by a lawful appropriation to a public use of the
land where the easement is located, or of other land
which will render the enjoyment of the easement
impossible.' 19 C. J. 957, Sec. 178." (Italics ours)
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In Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357; 7 N. E. 2d 262,
the court states:
uCommon use negatives the idea of a presumption in favor of an individual and does not thereby
establish a private way."
Also, at page 221 of 111 A.L.R., it is stated:
((Individual acquisition of a right of way by
prescription has been generally, if not universally,
held impossible, where the same right of user upon
which the claim is based has likewise been exercised
indiscriminately by the general public, upon the
theory that such a situation prevents the individual
user from being (exclusive' within the meaning of
that term as an essential requirement for the founding of prescriptive easements; such founding is
based upon the presumption of a grant, but use in
common with the public is regarded as negativing
this presumption, so that, if such common use exists,
the individual user must, in order to secure the benefit of the original presumption or establish an independent prescriptive right, perform some act,
brought home to the owner of the servient estate,
clearly indicating the user's claim."
Also, in Day vs. Allender, 22 Md. S 11, 111 A.L.R. 222,
it is stated:
ulf the proof is of a use common to all others
as well as to the party claiming the way, it does not
establish a private way .... The presumption of a
grant ... founded on proof of an adverse, exclusive
and uninterrupted enjoyment . . . and although
this presumption may be made from the character
of the user itself, ... yet, when it is shown by the
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evidence the easement was enjoyed in common with
others, the presumption in favor of the individual
ceases."
We submit that the intervener and defendants asserting a public trail and roadway is entirely inconsistent
with any claim of these defendants and intervener that
they had acquired a prescriptive easement, and particularly in view of the status of the evidence showing that the
course they followed was a ,course followed by the public,
and the above cases amply substantiate that contention. Such use was permissive and did not create any right.
As detailed above, the evidence shows that Neff, who
operated the company untill926, never had a conversation
with anyone about the way or the use of the way through
this country. Witness Cannon who succeeded Neff as
manager states that whenever an assertion was made as
to the right-of-way, he passed the buck; in other words,
made no assertion of a right to use it; said he would follow
the instructions to stay off the land, and so far as he could
he ordered the sheep through there as fast as could be accomplished. There is certainly no assertion of any claim
to a right to use this land by others than the first two managers of this corporation. This would be true up to and
until the year 19 32, at least.
Sharp in his testimony made no assertion of any rightof-way on any of the Deseret Livestock Company property, but indicated to the manager of that company
that he had some old hands with him and he was sure
they would follow the trail. There has never been any
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showing on the part of intervener that it ever asserted a
right-of-way through this country. Certainly it has shown
none for a period of twenty years.
In the case of Sdralis v. Rondos, Utah; 209 Pac.
(2d) 561, this Court announced the rule to be:
u (Where a person opens a way for the use of
his own premises, and another person uses it without causing damage, the presumption is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such use by
the latter was presumptive, and not under a claim
of right.' This rule was re-affirmed in Jensen
v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070. See the
cases cited in support of the rule in 170 A.L.R. 825.

((The facts of the instant case bring it within
the rule laid down in Harkness v. Woodmansee
since the defendant does not contend that the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title did not use the
alleyway for their own purposes. Indeed, the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs and their
predecessors made use of the alleyway in receiving
deliveries to their buildings and in gaining access
to the tin garbage at the east end of the alleyway."
The evidence is clear in the instant case from all of
the witnesses for intervener that the Deseret Livestock
Company has been using these lands for its own purposes
as a trail and grazing lands long prior to the time of the
incorporation of intervenor company in 1921. Those witnesses testified to the fact that Deseret Livestock Company
was grazing from 40,000 to 75,000 head of sheep long
prior to the existence of intervener. For this reason assigned
no right was created in intervener or defendants.
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We desire to submit to the Court that the easement
to trail and graze the various lands indicated by plaintiff
is an easement in gross and cannot be assigned and is personal to the person in whose favor it is given. The trail
from eastern Utah to eastern Nevada takes the intervener
across the entire State of Utah. The lands owned by it
were in Summit County and western Tooele County and
eastern Nevada. Surely the internever cannot hope to
contend that its history will antedate the date of its incorporation in 1921, because the easement described by it
in its amendment to its complaint in intervention describes
the claimed right-of-way as one in gross, and the decree
does not describe the right-of-way as being appurtenant
to any land.
As indicated above, therefore, any such purported
easement must be attributable to the acts of the intervener, and intervener cannot tack any other rights to establish its purported easement in gross. The first act to which
complaint could be made must be shown to be a claim or
assertion of right by intervener or a continuance of a
repeated act which would give notice in law of such a claim.
In the intsant case we have an open desert land, unenclosed, grazed and trailed at various times by herds of
sheep over an area 15 to 20 miles in width and over 60 miles
in length. Certainly a use twice a year will be presumed
in law to be permissive, unless very clear and direct acts
occur to indicate the :contrary.
In the case of Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash.
202, 116 Pac. 843, at page 845, the court states as follows:
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ult can hardly be contended that it was ever
the intent of the law to hold that a private easement
could be created over the lands of another at a time
when they were open and uninclosed. It has never
been so held, although the right be asserted by the
public, unless under some controlling circumstances, such as the expenditure of public moneys
under the supervision of the road overseer, or some
element of acquiescence on the part of the owner, as
instanced in the case of State v. Horlacher, 16 Wash.
325, 47 Pac. 748. We conceive it to have been so
held in Watson v. County Commissioners, 38 Wash.
662, 80 Pac. 201, where the court said: (While we
do not now hold that a right of way by prescription
cannot be acquired over wild, unoccupied prairie
lands, we do hold that, in order to give a prescriptive
right, the use must at least be such as to convey to
the absent owner reasonable notice that a claim is
made in hostility to his title. It seems to us that any
other rule amounts to a practical confiscation of
private property for public purposes.' It will be
admitted that the rule must of necessity be more
liberal in favor of the public than in favor of an
individual."
Volume 17, Am. Jur. at Page 980, Paragraph 71, reads
as follows:
nThe prevailing principle seems to be that
while a way may be acquired by user or prescription
by one person over the uninclosed land of another,
mere use of the way for the required time is not, as
a general rule, sufficient to give rise to the presumption of a grant. Hence, generally some circumstance or act, in addition to, or in connection with,
the use of the way, tending to indicate that the
use of the way was not merely permissive is required
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to establish a right by prescription. This rule seems
specially applicable to uninclosed land surrounding
a church, schoolhouse, or other similar building.
Moreover, in property of this class, of a semipubli,c
character, the usual liberality in permitting it to
be used in all ways not detrimental to its use by the
owner must be taken into consideration."
In the case of Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497,71 Pac.
(2d) 646, at Page 651 the Court states:
uln this state, where large bodies of privately
owned land are open and uninclosed, it is a matter
of common knowledge that the owners do not object to persons passing over them for their accommodation and convenience, and many such roads
are made and used by neighbors and others. Under
these circumstances it would be against reason and
justice to hold that a person so using a way over
lands could acquire any permanent right, unless his
intention to do so was known to the owner, or so
plainly apparent from acts that knowledge should
be imputed to him. Waller v. Hidlebrecht, 295 Ill.
116, 128 N.E. 807; Evans v. Bullock, 260 Ky. 214,
84 S.W. (2d) 26; Shroer v. Brooks, 204 Mo. App.
567, 224 S.W. 53; Bridwell v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 191 Ark. 227, 85 S.W. (2d) 712; I
Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 478."
Our Court in the case of Dahl v. Roach, 76 Ut. 74,
287 Pac. 622, at Page 623 of the Pacific Reporter states:
uPlaintiff makes no claim that the owner of
the servient estate was ever notified that plaintiff
claimed a right to travel over or use the way in controversy. Nothing was ever said at any time to the
owner of the servient estate that plaintiff did claim
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such a right. The evidence on behalf of defendants
is to the effect that no right was ever granted to
plaintiff to use such way for any purpose whatever.
Moreover, the proof by plaintiff's own witness, of
the use by plaintiff of defendant Jeremy's land, does
not show that in driving cattle to or over said
premises, or in driving wagons or other vehicles
thereover, they were confined to any particular
strip or portion of Jeremy's land. In fact, the testimony fails to sbow a continuous and exclusive use
of the right of tl/ay not only for the prescriptive
period, but for any length of time whatever." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481, 39 Pac.
(2d) 1070, the Court at Page 1072 of the Pacific Reporter
states as follows:
((Before a right of way can be acquired by prescription, the use for the prescriptive period must
be peaceable, continuous, open, adverse as of right,
and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
plaintiff and his grantors and predecessors in interest ....
uA twenty-year use alone of a way is not sufficient to establish an easement. Mere use of a roadway opened by a land owner for his own purpose
will be presumed permissive. An antagonistic or
adverse use of a way cannot spring from a permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when it rests upon a
license or mere neighborly acccnnmodation. Adverse
user is the antithesis of permissive user. If the use
is accompanied by any recognition in express terms
or by implication of a right in the landowner to stop
such use now or at some time in the future, the use
is not adverse." (Emphasis added.)
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In the light of the principle announced by our court,
it is of particular note that the manager of the Howell Livestock Company, Cannon, for all the years from 1926
through 1932, when requested by Moss to observe the rights
of the Deseret Live Stock, states that he accordingly either
((passed the buck," or he urged his sheep along just as fast
as he could. The witness, Neff, who managed the intervener
corporation from its incorporation in 1921 through 1926,
states that he never at any time talked with any person
about the use of the way, nor does he speak of having at
any time seen or contacted any of the agents of the plaintiff
corporation. Other witnesses of the defendants and
interveners, as we have set out before, always gave
excuses, for instance, the claim of one herder that
his sheep had sore feet and he wanted to keep them up
above and Moss then gave him permission to go up above.
'Never at any time, even as to the defendant Sharp,
has there been a clear assertion of any right to go through
that territory over the lands of the plaintiff corporation.
The strongest assertion that the defendant ever made was
that he would follow the trail as it had been historically followed by his predecessors.
In the Ohio case of Board of Education of Pultney
Township, Belmont County, v. Nichol, 46 N.E. (2d) 872,
is a case in which the defendant, Nichol, had lands which
surrounded a large uninclosed tract owned by the School
Board and over which tract the defendant had, for many
years, that is, for more than twenty-one years, crossed at
various points and wherever convenient to him in driving
to and from his lands and in crossing the said school lands
and grazing the same, and for such other and various pur-
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poses as would be convenient to him in the use of his own
lands. By reason of all such acts he claimed a right or easement to use all of the said lands by reason of the adverse
character of his own use. At page 877 the court states:
((Now, as to the claim of defendant, E. W.
Nichol, of a right and easement across the whole
parcel, his testimony convinces us that he has shown
no right by prescription to the use thereof; that his
use was a casual use, and nothing other than the use
which the general public would make of it, a permissive use, which could not ripen into a prescriptive right. He did not follow a beaten path, but
crossed the land wherever convenient. While there
is no evidence of a roadway thereover except to the
school building yet it is undisputed that defendant,
E. W. Nichol, did travel across it, but not by reason
of necessity, as he had highway access to his lands,
and such a road as was situated on tract one ended
at and was used only for the purpose of ingress and
egress from the school building, and he used it only
as the public generally might use it as a way of
convenience without the knowledge of plaintiff
board. Certainly by such use he would acquire no
prescriptive right to do so.
ult is a matter of common knowledge that
rural school properties are used by the public generally for private uses, passageways to adjoining
lands, and for public functions, and their use differs
as a matter of custom, from the public use of private
property. The public attitude is that school property is public property.
uwe believe that the rule applicable to his
claim of a right and easement across the whole parcel
was announced in the case of Kilburn & Another v.
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Adams, 48 Mass. 33, 7 Mete. 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754,
and quoted by this court in Davidson v. Dunn, 16
Ohio App. 263: (The rule we think is, that where
a tract of land, attached to a public building, such
as a meeting house, town house, school house, and
the like, and occupied with such house, is designedly
left open and unenclosed, for convenience or ornament, the passage of persons over it, in common
with those for whose use it is appropriated, is, in
general, to be regarded as permissive and under an
implied license, and not adverse. Such a use is not
inconsistent with the only use which the proprietors
think fit to make of it; and therefore, until they
think proper to enclose it, such use is not adverse,
and will not preclude them from enclosing it, when
other views of the interest of the proprietors render
it proper to do so. And though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open land more
frequently than another, yet the same rule will
apply, unless there be some decisive· act, indicating
a separate and exclusive use, under a claim of
right. * * * '
((In the case of Davidson v. Dunn, supra, this
court said in paragraphs two and three of the syllabus:
(( (Continuous use of a passageway over an uninclosed vacant lot in a city by the owner of an
adjoining lot in going to and from the residence
thereon to the street will not ripen into an easement by prescription, unless such passageway is of
such a permanent construction as to give notice of
a claim of right.
(((The making of a beaten path across an uninclosed vacant city lot by walking from the resi-
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dence on an ad joining lot to the street and return,
and at times spreading cinders or ashes thereon, is
not such infringement by the owner of the adjoining lot the rights of the owner of the vacant lot as
will give notice of an adverse claim.'

nA similar conclusion is reached in this case,
and is supported by the case of Schulenbarger v.
Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843, 845, 35
L.R.A., N.S., 941, which holds: (It can hardly be
contended that it was ever the intent of the law to
hold that a private easement could be .created over
the lands of another at a time when they were open
and uninclosed.' "
It is apparent from the evidence that ninety-five per
cent of all of the lands in this area are public domain and
open and available to all of the public who care to cross the
same. The use of that public domain and the use of all of
the lands, the fee title to which is owned by the plaintiff,
during the period it has been in the government, has been
permitted to be used by the public by way of government
license and no right could be established as against the government. These lands of the plaintiff, therefore, being adjacent to the federal lands, the right of the various users
to cross the same is at all times considered a permissive right
until there is such a clear assertion of a right by the person
who claims an interest in the land that we must consider
the fee owner to have knowledge of such asserted right.
There is nothing in any of the acts, statements or evidence
introduced in this case which shows that the interveners
had at any time made a clear assertion to the use of the
lands of the plaintiff as a use as of right. Their evidence
that the officers of the plaintiff .company had told them to
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stay off their lands, to keep on the trail, to keep below the
road, had posted signs at Burnt Springs is of itself sufficient
to establish the fact that any use by the intervener would
be subject to the rights of the plaintiff and could be terminated by the plaintiff at any time. This direction on the
part of plaintiff's agents is sufficient to stop the period
within which the defendant could attempt to show its
twenty-one year's use. These acts toll any period the intervener may claim to establish its prescriptive period and
such conversations having definitely taken place in the
thirties, we again urge this court to establish the fact that
there had been no adverse use for the prescriptive period
of twenty-one years.
In the case of Powell vs. Bagg, 74 Mass. 441, at page
443, Justice Bigelow says:
HFrom such use of an easement for twenty
years, the law will presume a non-appearing grant.
But before the lapse of that period, if the owner of
the land, by a verbal act on the premises in which
easement is claimed, resists the exercise of the right
and denies its existence, the presumption of a grant
is rebutted, his acquiescence in the right claimed is
disproved, and the essential elements of a title to an
easement by adverse use are shown not to exist. On
this point, the instructions given to the jury were
defective, and tended to mislead them in applying
the evidence to the rule of law, on which the title
of the defendant to the easement depended. They
should have been told, and this is the precise point
on which we sustain the exceptions, that if it was
proved that, before the expiration of twenty years
from the time when the right was first claimed, the
plaintiff, being on the land upon which the de-
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fendant entered for the purpose of subverting the
soil, there forbade him to exercise his right, and
ordered his servants to desist, it was sufficient to
warrant the jury in finding that the plaintiff had
not acquiesced in the adverse use of the easement,
and that the defendants had not acquired a title
thereto."
We have heretofore cited the case of Lindsay Land
and Live Stock Company vs. Churnos, supra, to the effect
that there must be a certainty of the line or course of any
road or trail which would be claimed and that neither an
individual nor the public could acquire a right to use or
pass over a tract of land generally, but only in a certain
way and line. This principle is further established as announced in 1 Thompson on Real Prop~rty, Page 726,
where it is stated:
uTo declare a prescriptive right of way by consent and uninterrupted use, the use must relate
strictly to the identical land over which the right is
claimed. It was said in one case that a road can not
be established with a variance of ten or twenty feet;
... Thus, a right of way by prescription can not be
acquired to wander generally and at random over
the property of another. Such right can be acquired,
only by the use of a definite and well-defined
route."
A good analogy of this principle would be that of airplanes traveling at a low level in approaching an airport.
The case in mind is Smith vs. New Engla·nd Aircraft Company, 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 69 A.L.R. 300, at
Page 39 3 of the Northeastern Report where the court says:
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uThe final point to be determined is whether
the circumstances are such as to require injunctive
relief. Upon that point the nature of the trespasses
shown is important. Although there appear to have
been a considerable number of trespasses by aircraft,
it seems plain that they are not in the same place
as to linear space or altitude. In the nature of things
the flights of aircraft must vary with wind and
load. No prescriptive right to any particular way
of passage could be acquired in these conditions."
It is clear from the evidence we have detailed in our
statement of facts and in this argument that where the
witnesses for the interveners show that the course the
sheep had followed varied over an area many miles in
width, where the wanderings of the sheep themselves from
one time to another had taken them to various patches of
feed, and that the persons had not attempted to keep the
course to any certain path, but on the .contrary had intentionally varied that path generally down through the
country, that there has never been established any path or
route direct by boundary or otherwise, which could permit
the court at any time to consider a path, trail, or road in
this area.

We submit further that the evidence as to the road
claimed through the upper country will not sustain that
road as a county road or a public road which would have
been reserved under the patents of the United States to
the State of Utah, and from the State of Utah to the plaintiff. This, for the reason that the road has never received
the dignity of a county road, never received the attention
of the county, and classified by all of the witnesses as a
turnout road used only when the old Lincoln Highway
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became impassable for the area from Burnt Springs to
Timpie Point. This road did not receive the dignity of any
description on the official county plat, it was not known by
the County Commissioner, Matthews, who was in charge
of that area, the witnesses, Hogan and Severe, who had
ranches and who had worked out there for years, never
knew of any such road, and most important of all is the
fact that there was no witness who testified as to any such
old road, who stated that he was able to go out on the
ground at the present time and determine where that road
went. Under such circumstances the court could not at
random select any certain point through that area several
miles in width and determine that the road would follow at
any particular point. 36-1-9 U.C.A. 1943 requires county
commissioners to determine all public highways in their
county and to prepare plats and descriptions of such roads.
Plaintiff's Ex. uA" shows this road has never been recognized by Tooele County. Further the county never put
any work on it. All work being on the old Lincoln Highway.
All of these cases cited indicate the burden upon the
person asserting the easement, either public or private, but
particularly when private to describe the easement by
meets and bounds of particularity, and to determine by
exact proof and establish by the burden of the proof the
location of any such claimed easement, and if the same is so
indefinite that it is not evidenced on the ground and no
witness can now point to the place where that road traversed, then the court itself has no evidence from which
it can determine where any such a road would have been.
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We have pointed out to the Court in this argument
the facts and the law upon which we have claimed that
there was no evidence to sustain a finding of the Court
that there had been a use by the interveners sufficient to
ripen into a private easement, and that there had been no
sufficient use by the public to establish a County road.
Further, we would like to submit to the Court the case of
the Town of Bethel v. Pruet, 250 Ill. 162; 74 N.E. 111. At
Page 113 of the N.E. Reporter the Court states:

It is said that the court erred in giving to the
jury the seventeenth instruction, which was given
for the appellee, to the effect that a prescriptive
right cannot be acquired to pass over a tract of land
generally, but such right must be confined to a
specific way, or definite, certain, and precise line.
The instruction correctly stated the law, as the same
is laid down in the text-books and authorities. Ellitt
in his work on Roads and Streets (2d Ed., Sec. 176)
says: ((The public cannot acquire a prescriptive
right to pass over land generally, and, where a highway is claimed by prescription, a certain and welldefined line of travel must be shown; but a slight
deviation on account of some obstacle will not affect the right. It is sufficient if the line of travel
has remained substantially unchanged, although at
times there may have been a slight deviation in
order to avoid (bad roads' or temporary obstructions." In the case at bar there was testimony tending to show that the travel which was shown to
have passed over the strip here in controversy was
due principally to the fact that there was a pond
in one part of the highway and a mudhole in another part, which made it necessary for persons
traveling along the highway north of appellee's land
to diverge from the main highway in order to avoid
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these obstructions. In Township of Madison v.
Gallagher, 159 Ill. 105,42 N.E. 316, we said: ((The
prescriptive right must be confined to a specific or
definite, certain, and precise line or way."
In
O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Railroad Co., 184
Ill. 308, 56 N.E. 355, we said: ((Nothing is better
settled than that a highway by prescription is not
created by public travel over the land generally, but
that the line of travel must be within definite limits." These limits may often be defined by fences
on side of the road, but they may be defined otherwise than by fences. In the case at bar the testimony
tends to show that there were two roadways, one
north and one south, and that between the two was
a growth of underbrush. The evidence is not clear
that the turning aside from the main road and
passing over the strip in question were not for the
mere temporary purpose of avoiding the obstructions referred to. As was said in Town of Brushy
Mound v. McClintock, 150 Ill. 129, 36 N.E. 976:
((It is unreasonable to suppose that road authorities
would claim, or a property holder suspect that a
public highway was to be located on the tortuous
line of the road in question." The divergence of
travel here over the strip in question made the highway at the point indicated a tortuous, instead of
a straight and direct, one. The fact of the construction of the hedge fence at the point named by
the appellee is a strong circumstance in support of
appellant's theory of the case, but it was only one
circumstance to be taken in to consideration by the
jury in connection with all the other circumstances
developed by the evidence. The evidence was conflicting as to the extent of the travel over the strip
in question, and under 'the instructions it was a
matter for the jury to determine.
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We submit that the above citation fully supports our
contention that there was no evidence from which another
public road can be found by the Court east of the old
Lincoln Highway. All of the witnesses described it as a
uturn-out" used only when the Lincoln Highway was impassable. Some of the witnesses indicated that there was
at times a lake covering the old Lincoln Highway in the
north end in wet seasons, and only at that time would they
turn out to the east. Any use of any upper turn-out,
where the course is shown by all of the evidence, physical
and verbal, to consist of a great number of trails and roads,
is so general and so inconsistent with a well-defined road
as to preclude any determination of a well-defined way
dedicated to the public. We submit the above quoted authority as conclusive on that matter.

1

For the same reason, this wandering, fragmentary, and
indefinite use of an area several miles wide by the interveners, with no trailing evidence as to where and on what
private lands of the interveners they ever cross, is so indefinite that it cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement
or way, or a profit a prendre, as illustrated by the above
Illinois case.
Further, in :finding No. 19, a trail 2000' in width as a
public trail is found by the Court; and in finding No.
20 the Court determines that a road 2,000 feet in width
was necessary and reasonable for the public in trailing;
and, whereas, in Finding No. 15 the Court determines that
the intervener has under a claim of use, both as a private
easement and as a public trail, followed a road and trail
3,000 feet in width uand that the public trail was as wide

I'

I
1

r
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as the sheep were being spread," we submit that under
these findings the Court has made the issue so inconsistent
that the findings cannot support the decree of a private
easement 3,000 feet in width-this for the reason that the
Court having found such trail to be a public trail uso far
as the sheep were spread" there can be no private easement
on a public trJil. Sullivan vs. Condas, supra, is conclusive
as to this point.
We submit the above authority of our own Court, the
Illinois Court, and others cited, are conclusive that any
such a varying, indefinite and general course cannot be
established or claimed as a public trail, and we submit that
both propositions of the interveners must fail.

As further authority on this point we submit the following from the case of Matthiessen v. Grand, 92 Cal. App.
504, 268 Pac. 675 at Page 678 in which the Court states:
Yet in view of the uncertainty of the location
or course of this ancient trail ten miles in length,
which meanders aimlessy through the midst of a
large cattle ranch, running over hills and down
dales, sometimes following a river ·canyon, clambering along an adjacent bluff, or skirting across a convenient mesa, with no attempt to definitely describe
its course by measurements or survey; with convincing evidence of numerous substantial changes
in the course, in spite of the defendants' contradiction of these changes; with proof of continuous
maintenance by the owner of locked gates across
the way, the evidence in the present case scarcely
measures up to the specific requirements of the law
with respect to the establishment of an easement by
prescription. Upon the contrary, such circum-
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stances strongly rebut the presumption created by
the mere use of the roadway. The right to the unhampered use and enjoyment of one's own property,
which is not in conflict with the rights acquired by
others, may not be thus recklessly destroyed. To
establish an easement to a right of way by prescription, the evidence of adverse possession should be
clear and positive, and the requirements should be
strictly construed. 9 R.C.L. 782, Sec. 40.
The line of travel over a roadway which is
claimed by prescription may not be a shifting
course, but must be certain and definite. Slight deviations from the accustomed route will not defeat
an easement, but substantial changes which break
the continuity of the course of travel will destroy
the claim to prescriptive rights. Vestal v. Young,
147 Cal. 721, 82 P. 383; Allen v. San Jose Land &
W. Co., 92 Cal. 138,28 P. 215, 15 L.R.A. 93; Oliver
v. Agasse, 132 Cal. 297, 64 P. 401; 19 C.J. 899
Sec. 77. A change of 2 0 feet in the location of a
ditch has been held to defeat an easement. Vestal
v. Young, supra; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.
App. 119, 180 P. 67. Although manifestly the distance to which a roadway may be changed without
destroying an easement will be determined somewhat by the character of the land over which it
passes, together with the value, improvements, and
purposes to which the land is adapted. The maintenance of gates by the owner, across the roadway,
when such gates are always kept locked, even though
keys may be supplied to the neighbors as a matter
of accommodation, is substantial proof of permissive use. Quinn v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 454, 11 P. 746;
Heertan v. Bevans, 51 Cal. Ap. 277, 196 P. 802;
Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P.
843, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941, note. We are of the
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opinion that the evidence in the present case is insufficient to support the findings establishing prescriptive title, in view of the foregoing well-established rules of law. It therefore becomes necessary
to reverse the judgment for lack of evidence in
that regard.
In the case of Romans 11. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14
N.W. 2nd at Page 486 the Court says in part as follows:
It is a well-known fact that many thousands
of homeowners have no boundary fences and that
adjoining owners occasionally trespass on their
neighbors' lands in cutting grass, trimming hedges,
and the like. Such harmless trespasses are committed upon the well-founded assumption that ordinarily a neighbor will acquiesce in and consent to
them. Such forebearances are expected of neighbors. They make for good relations between them.
As said of the acts referred to in the Bolton case,
such trespasses are not done with any intention of
acquiring adverse rights and are acquiesced in by
the owner without intending that such rights should
be established. If such trespasses should be held to
constitute a basis for prescriptive rights, every adjoining landowner in the cases mentioned would
acquire, after 15 years, an easement in his neighbors' lands to the extent of such trespass. This
shows the absurdity of allowing an easement in such
cases. Under such circumstances, something more
than such occasional uses of land should be required
to give rise to prescriptive rights. The trespasser
should be required to show by some additional acts
that the entry is hostile and under claim of right,
and thus run up his flag of hostile claim, so as to
warn the owner that, if he acquiesces, adverse rights
will be established against him.
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We cite further the case of O'Connell v. Chicago
Terminal Transfer R. Co., 56 N.E. Reporter, at Page 359,
in which the Court says in part as follows:
The general course of the alleged highway prior
to 1894 was considerably south of the macadam
road built in that year. Different diverging lines of
travel, none of which are in use for the requisite
period of 2 0 years, cannot be united in order to
make such period. Gentleman v. Soule, 32 Ill. 271.
Nothing is better settled than that a highway by
prescription is not created by public travel over
the land generally, but that the line of travel must
be within definite limits. These limits, and the location of the way or track are often precisely defined
by fences on the sides of the road. Town of Madison
v. Gallagher, supra; Gentleman v. Soule, supra;
City of Ottawa v. Yentzer, supra. Whatever use
of the road was shown by the testimony in case
seems to have been a use thereof by a few individuals in the neighborhood for particular purposes,
and not by the public generally. Such use by a few
individuals does not constitute such use by the public as creates title by prescription.
Conclusive of the fact that there could be neither a
public trail nor a private easement over the course is the
following quotation from Finding of Fact No. 15, wherein
it is said:

L

I
I

r

HTha t said use has been open and notorious and
that the private owner of said lands actually knew
at all times that said use was being made of said
lands; that the trailing and grazing of said sheep
over said lands and along said trail was done by
Howells Livestock Company, Inc. and its predecessors in interest, and defendants Sharp, under the
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claim of right of a private easement, and also that
they were following a public trail or road and that
the public trail was as wide as the sheep were being
spread."
We submit that this finding destroys any possibility of
a private easement because it admits the use was as of one
of the public. We submit that any such use as one of the
public under the authorities we have heretofore indicated
is clearly a permissive use, could never be adverse, and there
never could be any claim of a private easement. Any decree
intending to support a private easement upon a finding
that the use was by the intervener as one of the public is
entirely contrary to and without support in the law.
We desire to call the court's attention to Finding No.
19, wherein the court finds that a width of 2000 feet was
a reasonable width for a road for the trailing of sheep, and
in Finding No. 20, wherein the court finds that a road
2,000 feet in width was and is reasonably necessary for the
trailing of sheep through the area. There is no reason, therefore, in the evidence or the findings, to support a conclusion or decree which establishes a road 3000 feet in width.
We submit that there could not be any proof of a
private easement in intervener because the evidence affirmatively shows, and the finding of the court shows, that the
intervener claimed the right to use the trail as a member
of the public, its use therefore being permissive its proof
fails entirely as to an exclusive use in intervener for 21
years. Further, that there was no definite way used by the
intervener or defendants. In fact the evidence is to the
contrary and shows that they tried to avoid the path made
by the preceding herd.
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POINT NO. III
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE, PLEADING OR
FINDING FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD
FIND A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT AT BURNT
SPRINGS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENER.
In the cross complaint of the defendants, Sharp, paragraph 8 states that Burnt Springs is located on Deseret Livestock Company's property; that the water is suitable for
watering livestock and for use by human beings; that no
one has ever used the waters except the defendants, the
interverners and other members of the public. In paragraph 13 it is alleged that the trail is adjacent to Burnt
Springs and that the trail and roadway and the waters at
Burnt Springs have been used by the defendants, the interveners and the public for watering purposes. In paragraph
15 it is alleged that Burnt Springs was in existence when
the lands of the plaintiff were public domain, and that
Burnt Springs was used by the defendants, interverner and
the public generally, for trailing and watering stock, and
that the Federal government conveyed lands to the state
of Utah subject to the right of the public to use the water
at Burnt Springs.
In the complaint in intervention it is alleged in paragraph 10 that Burnt Springs is located on Deseret Livestock Company's property; that the waters form a channel and there is a one-half second foot of water in this
natural channel. Paragraph 11 sets forth that the waters
for fifty years have been and still are suitable for livestock
and for human beings. Paragraph 12 sets forth that none
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of the waters have been appropriated except by intervener,
its tenants, the defendants, and the intervener and predecessors appropriated and used the waters of Burnt Springs
in 1895 while the land was public domain. In paragraph
15 it is alleged that the trail is adjacent to Burnt Springs
and that the trail and roadway and the water at and from
Burnt Springs had been used and appropriated by intervener for stock watering and for human use. In paragraph
17 it is set out that the trail and roadway and Burnt
Springs were in existence at the time the plaintiff's lands
were public domain, and that Burnt Springs was appropriated and used by the predecessors of intervener, and
the Federal government in 1900 conveyed said lands to the
state of Utah subject to the right of intervener and its
predecessors to use the water at Burnt Springs, and that
the state of Utah conveyed the lands to the plaintiff subject to the right of intervener and its predecessors to use
the water of Burnt Springs.
From these pleadings it is clearly set forth that whatever rights the intervener and defendants have in Burnt
Springs are based upon reservations appearing in the patents
from the United States to the state of Utah, and from the
state of Utah to the plaintiffs. It is also clear in this complaint that the rights of the intervener and defendants are
limited to a claimed appropriation or right to use the waters.
There is nothing at any point in either the cross complaint
or the complaint in intervention, or any amendments
thereto, which at any time sets forth that in conjunction
with the rights to use the waters at Burnt Springs the intervener or defendants ever entered upon any lands of the
plaintiff to reach the waters; There is no allegation that
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the waters rose and disappeared entirely upon the lands of
the plaintiff. There is the allegation that the waters formed
a natural channel. That channel, as far as the pleadings
are concerned, may or may not have crossed some of the
lands of the plaintiff. There is no allegation in the cross
complaint or the complaint in intervention as to which
lands of the plaintiff Burnt Springs is located uponwhether it is upon lands involved in the complaint or other
lands. In the stipulation as to title, to which we have
referred many times heretofore, it was agreed that the only
rights of intervener and defendants would be those which
they could show as reserved by the provisions of the patents
from the United States Government and the state of Utah.
In their pleadings, as we have indicated heretofore, the
intervener and defendants have set forth that the rights
to the waters of Burnt Springs were reserved by the provisions of the patents from the United States and the state
of Utah. Certainly any attempt to assert a private right
at Burnt Springs is entirely inconsistent with the stipulation
and with the pleadings, and any judgment based upon
these pleadings, giving a private easement to lands in or
around Burnt Springs, finds no support whatsoever in the
pleadings or the evidence. The pleadings do not assert a
right to cross any of the lands of the plaintiff to reach the
waters of Burnt Springs. There is nothing to show in the
pleadings where the waters of Burnt Springs were used;
for all it appears, they could have been used off of the lands
of the plaintiff and on the public domain. We have here,
therefore, a situation in which the court has decreed to the
intervener a right established by prescription in the watering of 11,000 sheep, to spread the sheep along the banks
of said stream from Burnt Springs to a width of 5 00 feet
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to the north and 500 feet to the south, and to spread said
sheep along said stream from the headwaters of said Burnt
Springs to a point 800 feet distant from said headwaters.
(Third paragraph, page 3 of Decree.) This decreed easement or right is not supported by any pleading of intervener or defendants and particularly there is no claim or
description in their pleadings of any right or the boundaries
or direction or course of the right to get onto plaintiff's
lands.
We submit that this provision of the decree is not
supported by the pleadings, is not supported by the evidence, and is in fact contrary to law. We have heretofore
pointed out to the court that the pleadings do not describe
or even claim an easement over the land to water at Burnt
Springs. There is no course mentioned in the pleadings.
There is no place of watering mentioned in the pleadings.
The only mention made is that'Burnt Springs is adjacent
to the trail or roadway. Nothing is said of a right to cross
the lands of the plaintiff to reach the springs. Nothing is
said as to where that right would commence, where it
would end, and nothing is said as to where the animals or
human beings would secure the waters from Burnt Springs.
We have further shown to the court that this right
to use the waters at Burnt Springs is claimed to have been
reserved under the patents of the Federal and state governments, and therefore the right to the waters would be a
public right and a private right could not be initiated
under pleadings setting forth such a public right. If the
right is in the public, any use by an individual must necessarily be deemed permissive. That principal was clearly
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announced in the case of Thornley Land & Livestock Company vs. Morga.n Brothers Land & Livestock Company,
81 Utah 317, 17 P. 2d 826, where the court states:
((While a public road may be so established, the
use by individual persons in common with the public
generally is regarded as permissive, and by such
common use no individual person can acquire a
right by prescription as against the owner of the
fee."
The evidence in the case clearly shows that while this
land was unenclosed,-and that was the condition for all
of the years prior to 1948-the waters at Burnt Springs
were used by numerous individuals as they trailed through
the country. In this connection, we desire to point out to
the court that if there is any doctrine well established in
this area it is that where persons travel through and across
the open unenclosed desert area of this state, crossing the
unenclosed lands of any individual certainly not more often
than twice a year, such crossing is deemed permissive, and
certainly any person in that desert area taking waters will
be deemed to have been taking these waters by permission,
unless clear and unequivocal assertion of a right to use
the water is made.
As to the right to use the water at Burnt Springs, there
is not any place in the evidence any statement or claim by
any individual that he had ever advised any employee or
officer of the plaintiff that he was watering there under a
claim of right. No conversation, no discussion of any kind
is to be found in the evidence relative to the right to water
at Burnt Springs. The pleadings assert that Burnt Springs
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is not included within the boundaries of any claimed
public road or trail. They allege it is adjacent to the trail.
There is not at any time raised in the evidence any instance
wherein any conversation, any observation or any knowledge was ever had that the defedants or intervener were
watering at Burnt Springs. The entire evidence as to the
use of Burnt Springs by the intervener or defendants 1s
found in the following excerpts:
The witness Samuel Neff, at pages 45 and 46 of his
deposition, states that he watered sheep at Burnt Springs.
At page 48 he said he had horses drink out of the spring.
At page 50 he states that as they would pass the spring
they would water and trail on. At page 51 he states that
other users of the trail watered at Burnt Springs. At page
52 he states that they were never interfered with in watering at the spring and had never had a conversation concerning it with anyone. At page 57 he states that his sheep
watered at Burnt Springs in 1911. At page 59 he says he
watered at Burnt Springs. At page 62 Neff describes the
appearance of the spring, detailing nothing about the use.
At page 191 of the transcript, Jaspar Brown, a witness
of the defendants, states that in 1920 the Western Pacific
made a channel at Burnt Springs to run into a reservoir and
to pipe the water over to their Dell station, and that they
made a ravine to this pond, and that Deseret Livestock
Company had made changes in the course of the stream
where they plowed some furrows and scattered the water
out over the land. At page 192 he states that Deseret Live
Stock Company had put up dams in one of the ravines.
Jaspar Brown, testifying as to his own use of the water of
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Burnt Springs, states at page 194 that for fifty years he
watered sheep at Burnt Springs, and at page 201 of the
transcript he states that the sheep were watered winter
and fall as he was passing through.
Joseph Stillman, a witness for the defendants and intervener, states at page 230 that he himself watered his
sheep at Burnt Springs as he passed through the country.
At page 232 of the transcript Stillman describes the spring
as a half circle, with the water gathering at a point below
the springs. At page 234 Stillman states he watered at
Burnt Springs.
Earl Palmer, a district grazer and witness for the
defendants and intervener, states at p. 258 that the waters
of the spring are darned and are gathered into a channel
from the dam. At p. 265 of the transcript he states that
he has seen the sheep of the intervener Howells, a corporation, watered at Burnt Springs.

1

I~

The witness, Dayton, for the defendants (one of their
sheep herders) states at page 308 of the transcript that he
ha~ watered sheep at Burnt Springs, and at page 316 states
that they were given permission to water their sheep at
the Deseret Livestock Company ranch at Iosepa.
Peter A. Jensen, the foreman for the defendants,
testifies at pages 3 37, 3 39 and 3 52 of the transcript, and
states, ccwe have watered at Burnt Springs." The witness
Clark, one of the sheep herders of the defendants, states at
pages 366 and 369 that they watered at Burnt Springs. It
is particularly interesting to note that the testimony of
all of the witnesses indicates that Burnt Springs is west
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of the present main county highway. The witness Peter
Jensen states at page 3 53 of the record that his herds
never got west of that county road as they proceeded from
Timpie to the losepa ranch. From all of this testimony the court can clearly see that at no place in the entire
record have the defendants or interveners at any time
stated where they watered, how they watered, what land
they were on or how they got to the water or any point
on the water, at Burnt Springs.
Their witnesses have indicated that the waters from
Burnt Springs travel a distance well in excess of a mile. One
witness indicated that he had not been able to see far
enough to the west to see just how far that water traveled.
An indication merely that these individuals watered from
the waters of Burnt Springs, or watered at Burnt Springs,
is no description as to the point, trail, path or roadway at
which this watering was done. In the first place it would
be presumed that in any watering the persons using the
waters would do so lawfully and there would not be any
trespass involved.
From this testimony it becomes immediately clear to
the court that Judge Ellett could not from judicial
knowledge, or without some testimony to justify his determination, state what territory was covered in watering at
Burnt Springs. Certainly there is nothing in the evidence
to justify any findings or any decree establishing an easement 1000 feet wide and 800 feet in length at Burnt
Springs. The testimony shows that there have been dams
constructed. The pictures show that the plaintiffs have
constructed upon their lands a large reservoir. The testi-
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mony shows that the waters have been spread out by dams
and ditches over a large area of this land of the plaintiffs
at Burnt Springs, and that this situation has existed for
many years. The testimony of Neff and others shows that
the course of any water is now made by means of an
artificial channel.
The cases and authority we have cited in support of
our Point No. II set out the principle that any person
claiming a private easement over the lands of another must
set forth that easement in his complaint so definitely that
a person can locate it on the ground and it will support in
detail any decree or judgment entered thereon. These
cases show that such easement must be defined by use, by
description of the place of the use in the pleadings, with
evidence to support that use and to clearly show the
boundaries of the use, that it was adverse and that under
these circumstances the party claiming the easement had
made known to the land owner his adverse claims throughout a period of twenty-one years. None of these requirements have been met by the interveners or defendants in
their evidence or pleadings and as a matter of law their
pleadings are contrary and conflicting in setting up :1
public right as to preclude any private easement.
POINT NO. IV
THE EASEMENT IN GROSS WHICH THE
COURT DECREED TO INTERVENER IS EXCESSIVE AND SO INDEFINITE THAT AS A
MATTER OF LAW THE JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE. THIS STATEMENT APPLIES TO
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THE AREA AT BURNT SPRINGS AS WELL AS
THE OTHER POINTS, AND INCLUDES THE
FURTHER PROPOSITION THAT THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN AN EASEMENT
IN GROSS.
In Volume I of Thompson on Real Property, Perm.
Ed., at page 738, paragraph 451, it is stated:

uAn easement acquired by prescription is limited to a reasonable and usual enjoyment thereof.
The servient owner is entitled to all the rights and
benefits of ownership consistent with the easement.
So there can be no prescriptive easement so large as
to preclude the ordinary uses of the land by the
owner. No one can be considered, for instance, to
have a right of property worth holding in land over
which the whole world has the privilege to walk and
to deposit itself at pleasure. It would seem that a
claim in the nature of an easement incapable of
judicial control and restriction could not be sustained by prescription. The rule is well settled that
a highway by prescription is not created by public
travel over the land generally, but that the line of
travel must be within definite limits." (Italics ours.)
We submit under the principle announced by Thompson, supra, that the decree of Judge Ellett that the interveners had an easement in gross 3000 feet in width constitutes a confiscation of all of the lands of the plaintiff
throughout three townships, and violates and is entirely
contrary to the principle announced. The easement decreed
is so indefinite that it is not subject to location upon the
ground. In the Wyoming case of Bishop vs. Hawley, 3 3
Wyo. 271, 238 Pac. 284, the court found that drovers used
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a trail 500 to 1200 feet in width but decreed that as a
matter of law the way would be limited to 100 feet in
width stating:
((We find that it is a general principle that,
where such an easement is granted but not defined,
the privilege must be a reasonable one for the purpose for which it was created."
In explaining this further we quote from Montgomery
vs. Comers, 50 Oregon 259; 90 Pac. 674:
rr It would be unreasonable, however, to say that,
where loose stock being driven, travel promiscuously,
although in a general unifortn direction, over a strip
of land 75 to 100 yards in width, the user is therebJ'
confined to a certain and well defined line of travel,
and that a right of easement attaches to the whole
width thereof, because the claim is broader than the
reasonable necessity of the case'. The unreasonableness of the asserted claim is established by the fact
shown by this record that, at other places on this
same trail, the thread of travel is only a few feet in
width, being confined and limited by the nature of
the country to such smaller latitude."

How true this is in the principal case where the trail
is 100 feet wide for Yz mile at Iosepa.
At page 599 of the record, Judge Ellett, in ruling on
plaintiff's objection to the amendment to the complaint to
set up a profit a prendre, states:
((It seems to me that this is just in furtherance
of the proof that was given to the court. The')'
claimed public right-of-way. They didn't prove it,
but they proved-! mean a private profit a prendre
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across there, an easement in gross, and I don't see
that is any different than what the proof made, so
the amendment will be permitted." (Emphasis
added.)
At a time in about the middle of the trial, the exact
point the record does not disclose, Judge Ellett first suggested to the defendants and intervener that in view of the
testimony that they travelled wherever they wanted over
a wide part through this area, wherever they might find
better feed, by their use the defendants had acquired a
profit a prendre to graze the lands of the plaintiff. This
was the first any such right had ever been conceived by
any person, and at the time it was suggested it was discussed
by the parties off the record and in the arguments before
Judge Ellett, and determined that there were no pleadings
to support any such issue. As pointed out by Judge Ellett
himself, this case was tried and presented to him under
the theory that there was a public trail through these lands.
The defendants and intervener never at any time conceived
they had anything else. The court volunteered to them the
proposition that they may have a profit a prendre, and in
spite of the stipulation by the counsel that the only rights
the intervener or defendants would have would be those
that came to them by reservations in the patent, the court
has conceived a theory of its own and proceeded without
support of the pleadings and as a complete matter of surprise to confiscate the lands of the plaintiff and donate
them to the intervener and the defendants. Three thousand feet is well in excess of a one-half mile, and a course
three thousand feet in width, particularly in Townships
I and 2 South, as a practical matter constitute a confiscation, as we have heretofore set forth, of all of the lands of
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the plaintiff in those townships. To show the utter fallacy
of this determination of Judge Ellett needs only to recall
the testimony of Pharis Johnson, who testified that there
was once a trail out through that area, but that the trail
might well be through greasewoods which have now grown
up in the area and its exact location is not known. Judge
Ellett himself said that wherever the old road was, no witness would agree with him, and we have given you that
quotation heretofore. The fact tha~ this purported 3000
feet profit a prendre is to follow a general course of a road
which the court itself arbitrarily locates shows the highhanded method employed by the court in this case.
We desire in this connection to once again call the
court's attention to the statement from Finding of Fact
No. 15, wherein the court says that the ((Howells Livestock
Company, Inc. and its predecessors in interest and defendants Sharp, under the claim of right of a privat~ easement,
and also that they were following a public trail or road
and that the public trail was as wide as the sheep were
being spread." We submit at the outset that this finding
is conclusive against any claim on the part of the interveners or defendants to a profit a prendre. It describes their
use as being under claim of use of a public trail. Under all
of the authorities, and particularly the Utah cases we have
cited, the public use is conclusive against any private right.
These are so inconsistent that they cannot stand, could not
support a decree on either a public or private right, and the
decree itself must therefore be set aside and declared a
nullity wherein it attempts to decree to the intervener a
private easement for trailing, and further, for the right
to graze all of plaintiff's lands in both the spring and fall.
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It is well to keep in mind that under the decree of Judge
Ellett he has given to the interveners the right to graze
any and all of the lands of plaintiff within the 3000 feet
area wherever that might be, and specifically all of Section
36, in Township 2 South, and Section 2, in Township 3
South, both Range 8 West. Throughout the three months
which could be officially designated the spring and throughout the three months which could be officially designated
the fall, the Court has given to intervener the right to
graze all of the plaintiff's lands, as heretofore set forth, and
to entirely usurp those lands for the one purpose for which
they have value to the plaintiff, and that is for their feed.
In this connection it is well, too, to consider that the court
has permitted intervener the right to graze and trail its
sheep along a 3000 feet trail, and then for some reason, we
assume only known to the court, he permits the intervener
the right to trail its sheep only across Sections 3 6 and 2,
aforesaid; as these are adjoining sections we speculate as
to how the court expects the sheep of intervener, unnumbered in quantity and up to as many as it should desire,
to trail across these two sections, two miles in width, without grazing on the same. There is no evidence that would
ever support such a use and it is interesting to note from
the defendants' Exhibit 5 that in order to reach these two
sections the interveners would have to take their animals
entirely away from and depart from the Government trail
which they would be permitted to follow, and would of
necessity have to trespass upon public domain which they
would not be permitted to do.
There are very few cases wherein a profit a prendre
by prescription is discussed in this country. At common
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law there is no principle more clearly established than that
the public cannot acquire a profit a prendre by prescription. It is likewise well established that a profit a prendre
must be attached to a dominant estate. This requires real
estate and it cannot attach to personalty. The nearest
realty owned by the interveners is that at Timpie Point.
That land is not adjacent to the lands of the plaintiff and
is several miles to the east and north of any lands herein
involved and is separated by a mountain range. Other
than this one piece of land the other lands of intervener
are 13 0 to 200 miles east and west of plaintiff's lands herein
involved. There is nothing in the pleadings, findings or
decree setting forth that this profit is appurtenant to any
of the lands of the intervener. There is nothing in the
evidence to ever support any such claim. In the case of
John Waters vs. David Lilly, 4 Pick. (21 Mass.) 145, 16
Am. Dec. 3 3 3, one who had a reservoir or lake entirely
located upon his lands was held to have an exclusive right
to fish thereon and any person entering thereon to take
fish was held to be a trespasser. This trespasser, the defendant, claimed that he had a profit a prendre to enter
upon the water and take fish. At page 148 the court says:

I

HI£ such a right is available at all it must be set
up by prescription as belonging to some estate, and
should be pleaded with a que esta'te."
In that case the court rejected the evidence offered by
the defendant of a custom for all of the inhabitants to
take fish from the pond. The profit a prendre, as the court
indicates, is a private easement and would be destroyed
where it is shown that any right claimed is as a right of
one of the public. We submit that in accordance with the
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above authority all of the cases cited under our Point No. II
clearly hold that in unenclosed property surrounded by
the public domain, any use is deemed to be permissive, and
whereas the evidence shows that the intervener and its
predecessors were trailing through this country at the rate
of several miles per day, where their course varied from
year to year and as the sheep would wander, there could
never have been established any use of this land as a claim
of right, and that the same law applies here as under our
Point No. II.
We further submit that neither Judge Ellett nor the
interveners knew what they were after because the Judge
describes, as heretofore quoted, the right acquired as a
profit to prendre to feed off and graze the lands, which
type of easement would be assignable, and then at the
same time in his decree, in his findings and in the amendment submitted by the interveners they describe an easement in gross. If the right claimed, therefore, is an easement in gross it is a right that has been acquired only by
the interveners, unattached to any realty and to be used
only by the intervener. That right is not assignable. It
cannot be enlarged upon or given to any other person. It
cannot be a profit a prendre because a profit a prendre can
be acquired only as a part of a dominant estate and the
pleadings, the evidence, the findings and the decree do not
support any such prescriptive easement as a part of a dominant estate. As cited in Smith v. Dennedy, 194 N.W. 999:
cc (An easement appurtenant is defined as an
incorporeal right, which, as the term implies, is
attached to and belongs to some greater or superior
right; something annexed to another thing more
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worthy which passes as incident to it. Easements
appurtenant inhere in the land, concern the
premises, and are necessary to the enjoyment thereof. They are incapable of existence separate and
apart from the particular messuage or land to which
they are annexed, there being nothing for them
to act upon. They are in the nature of covenants
running with the land, attach to the land, to which
they are appurtenant, and pass by deed of conveyance.' 19 C. J. 865.
(Under the rule that there can be no easement
without a distinct dominant tenement, it is said
that there can, in strictness, be no such thing as an
easement in gross. But there is a class of rights
which one may have in another's land without their
being exercised in connection with the occupancy
of other lands, and they are therefore called rights
or easements in gross, and in such cases the burden
rests upon one piece of land in favor of a person or
an individual. The principal distinction between
an easement proper, that is an easement appurtenant, and a right in gross is found in the fact that
in the first there is and in the second there is not a
dominant tenement.' 19 C. J. 866."
H

Under the principle of laws announced above, we
would urge upon this court that under a fact situation as
involved in this case, where the intervener is covering a
distance of 300 miles in trailing from its lands in Wyoming
to its lands in Nevada, travelling public roads entirely in
making that trail, that the occasional wandering of sheep
will not be recognized by this court as creating an easement,
whether appurtenant or gross. We submit that under the
rule announced any intermittent wandering upon unenclosed private lands within the public domain could not
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create an easement by prescription because there is no dominant estate to which it could be appurtenant or attached.
The claimed trail which the court has given the intervener
as a prescriptive easement neither terminates nor commences on any lands of the intervener. It is nothing more
than a general course along our established public highways
which the testimony shows their wagons never left. In
Volume 28, C.J.S., at page 639, it is stated:

(CAn essential feature of a right of way appurtenant has been held to be that it must have one
of its termini on the land to which it is claimed to
be appurtenant, and it has been held that if it has
neither of its termini on the premises of the owner
and is not appurtenant to any estate it is a right of
way in gross, but there is authority to the contrary."

:!'

;v

The question necessarily arises, because of the pleadings and
the decree establishing the rights of intervener to be an
easement in gross, as to whether this court should recognize
as an easement in gross the varying wanderings of sheep
as they are driven along a general course within close
proximity and adjacent to the camp wagons which are
following the established state and county road. There is
no dispute in the evidence that the present county road
constructed in the early twenties has been the only course
travelled by the wagons of intervener as the herds went
north and south through Skull Valley.
Neff, Jensen,
Palmer, Cannon, Sharp and all of defendants' witnesses
have so testified as heretofore pointed out. Could the
wanderings of the herd travelling along adjacent to such
road over these unenclosed desert lands create a right which
this court will recognize? We submit that any policy
recognizing such a right is clearly contrary to any policy
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or tradition of this western country, and we submit that
as a matter of law it is not, as an easement in gross or a
profit a prendre, such a use as this court will permit to be
recognized. In other words, we submit that in this fact
situation, wherein sheep are wandering from side to side on
the road, over a course 300 miles long, the owner so trailing
will not thereby be permitted to subject all the lands along
that course to a claim of a profit a prendre and an easement in gross. Certainly, where there is a well established
road along which these parties can follow, in which they
in general are following, no other way over private lands
will be recognized as a policy of this State. Certainly,
where lands are available for their forage and where the
private lands represent only 5% of the public domain, our
court will recognize no right other than such public road as
is established according to Ia w. Any other policy will mean
the confiscation of thousands of acres of land in the open
country of this State, and remove these lands from the tax
rolls of the State.

I

I

I
I

I

POINT NO. V
LAND THE TITLE TO WHICH WAS IN THE
STATE OF UTAH AND BEING PURCHASED
UNDER CONTRACT WITH THE STATE OF
UTAH BY JEREMY AND LEASED FROM JEREMY BY THE DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY
COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.
Paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact is to the effect
that Sections 16 and 32, Township 1 South, Range 7 West,
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are being purchased from the State of Utah by E. J.
Jeremy. As appears at Page 594 of the transcript, this contract was first entered into September 26, 1924, and was
cancelled May 1, I935. On August 22, 1935, that contract was reinstated and carries No. 22246.
At Page 594 of the transcript, and likewise in Paragraph 13 of the Findings, it is further made to appear that
under a contract with E. J. Jeremy the State of Utah sold
to E. J. Jeremy the North half of the Southeast Quarter
of the Southwest Quarter of Section 2I, Township I South,
Range 7 West; the East Half of the East Half of Section
20, and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
of Section 29, Township I South, Range 7 West. The finding of the Court in Paragraph I3 that this contract was
dated March 7, I925, is not supported by the evidence.
Such a date was never introduced in evidence at the trial.
It does appear that the contract was cancelled May I, I936,
and reinstated May 7, I936.
Under another contract which had been paid, and for
which patent had issued, but the date of the contract never
having been introduced in evidence, the following land
was deeded to E. J. Jeremy by the State of Utah February
1, 1946. That patent covered the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 29, the Southeast Quarter
of the Southeast Quarter of Section 31, all in Township 1
South, Range 7 West; and it also covered Lot 1, Section 6,
Township 2 South, Range 7 West.
All of the lands, therefore, of the plaintiff involved in
the complaint and lying in Township 1 South, Range 7
\Vest, and involving the first four miles south of Timpie
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Point, are leased by the plaintiff from E. J. Jeremy. The
date of the lease from Jeremy was never introduced into
the evidence at the trial of this case. Of the land leased, the
only evidence in the record as to the date of any contract
of purchase from the State is that covering Sections 16 and
32, Township 1 South, Range 7 West, which is dated
September 26, 1924, and on which patent has never issued.

As to the property covered by patent, the evidence
shows that patent was issued February 1, 1946. As to the
other lands involved in the lease from Jeremy, the only
date in the evidence is that of the cancellation of the contract under date of May 1, 1936, and the reinstatement
of the contract May 7, 1936.
There is one principle of law that must be conceded
and that is that a private prescriptive right could not be
acquired against a lessor because of the acts of the lessee.
There has never been in the testimony any claim of an
assertion of right as against E. J. Jeremy. The date of the
lease of these lands from Jeremy to the plaintiff corporation is not in evidence. At the outset, therefore, the record
stands that whatever use has been made of the lands of
E. J. Jeremy by the intervener and defendants, there is
nothing in the evidence to show that they ever claimed
such a right against E. J. Jeremy. There is nothing in the
evidence to show that at any time he had any knowledge
whatsoever that the intervener or defendants were on his
property.
The fact remains that the intervener corporation, by
the testimony of its manager Samuel Neff, covering the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(
,,.

107

period of the intervener's incorporation from 1921 to
1926, when Neff left the company, is to the effect that
Neff or the intervener corporation never talked with or
was questioned by anyone at any time over the use of any
of the land in Skull Valley. The record does not show at
any time that Jeremy had any knowledge whatsoever of
of any trespass on his lands. There is no testimony that
E. J. Jeremy, during any prescriptive period initiated by
the intervener corporation, was ever in Skull Valley, or had
any reason to know where, how or when intervener was
operating its sheep as it proceeded from Wyoming to the
Valley twice a year. Certainly there is no reason to believe
they were claiming a strip 3000 feet in width across his
lands as they went through Skull Valley.
In 1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) , Page
699, it is stated:
HSince a tenant for years or for life cannot
grant away the interest of the remainderman or
reversioner, it is held that adverse user of a right
over the land in possession of such tern porary holder
does not create an easement that can prevail against
the succeeding owner. Thus, where a right of way
was claimed because of adverse use for time out of
mind, over land possessed for most of the time by
a tenant for ninety-nine years, whose lease had recently expired, it was held that the claim was not
effectual against the owner of the inheritance. However, an easement may be acquired against a lessee
by grant which will be good against him for theremainder of his term. Accordingly, it has been held
that neither at common law nor by the English
Prescription Act can an easement by prescription
be established against lessees of the crown, inasmuch
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as the easement would not bind the reversion; and
it has been held, too, that the user of a way adversely
and under a claim of right for more than twenty
years over land in the possession of a lessee who held
under a lease for lives granted by the Bishop of
Worcester gave no right as against the bishop, and
did not affect the lessee. In such case, as the user
could not give title as against all persons having
estates in the land, it gave no title as against the
lessee and persons claiming under him. No title
was gained by a user which did not give a valid title
as against the bishop and permanently affect the
land." (Italics ours.)
Further illustrating this point is Par. 458, Illustration
7, Restatement of the Law, Vol. 5 on Property, where it
is stated:
((A has a life estate in Blackacre. B has a remainder in fee. C, the owner of neighboring land,
uses a way across Blackacre in connection with the
use of his, C's land. C uses the way without consent
being asked or given. C's use is wrongful as to A.
B can show no such physical alteration of Blackacre
by reason of the use as to cause harm to him in his
future possession. The use is neither wrongful nor
capable of being made by him wrongful as to him.
C's use, while adverse to A, is not adverse to B."
We have heretofore pointed out that property was
leased to Deseret Livestock Company for the purpose of
trailing and grazing its herds over the Jeremy land. The
Livestock Company was operating four to five times as
many herds as the intervener. The use of Deseret Livestock Company in having its herds cross the lands and having its wagons make tracks through the country is a use to
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be expected by Jeremy, and unless he was to be in Skull Valley on one or two days, or fraction of days, at the time defendants and intervener were taking their sheep through
the country, he could have no knowledge of their acts.
There will be nothing on the ground to evidence to him
any different use of the property than that for which he
had leased it.
Under this principle announced in the Restatement,
therefore, and the law as further cited above, there could
be no prescriptive right asserted against the Deseret Livestock Company, because there could be no implied grant
from the lessee, and there could be no right asserted
against Jeremy because, as the evidence shows, there was
nothing on the land or nothing in the evidence whatsoever to indicate that he had any knowledge of the use by
intervener.
We submit that the conclusive answer to any claim
of a prescriptive right on these lands, title to which is still
in the State of Utah and being purchased by Jeremy, and
to the effect that intervener could have no easement over
the same, is the following quotation from the case of
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah, 57; 276 Pac. 912. At Page 74
of the Utah Reports the Court states:
ult may be conceded that plaintiff is supported
by the authorities in his contention that an easement
by prescription cannot be acquired over land belonging to the state or the United States, 19 C. J.
Sees. 23, 24, p. 876, and cases cited in the footnote.
Such has been declared to be the law in this jurisdiction as applied to land belonging to the United
States. * * : - As to the land conveyed to plaintiff
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by the state of Utah in 1913, obviously a prescriptive easement could not be acquired up to 1922
when this suit was begun."
All of these lands in Skull Valley here involved are
school lands, and in the case of Duchesne County v. State
Tax Commission, 104 Utah, 365; 140 Pac. (2d) 335, at
Page 370 of the Utah Report, the Court states:
uDoes the state hold the estate school fund'
whether represented by land or money, in its own
right, or merely as trustee of an express trust?"

.
I

I,

I:

I'

it

On Page 371 it states:

l

l~

• J[

ult must follow that the state holds the cfund'
as a trustee of an express trust, limited in the
amount, that can be expended, and the purposes and
uses thereof."

'L~

~

In view of this declaration the authorities are numerous to the effect that the State could do nothing to permit
the title of the trust to be impaired in any way. It is under
this theory that, whether the land is held by the State or
whether the land is being sold under contract, no prescriptive right to impair the title of the State can be created,
and no prescriptive right can be initiated until title has
passed from the State.
POINT NO. VI
LAND THE PATENT TO WHICH HAD BEEN
ISSUED FROM THE UNITED STATES OR THE

~ntl

STATE OF UTAH FOR LESS THAN TWENTY

~~
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YEARS COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.
In the map enclosed in this brief we have outlined the
fee lands of plaintiff which the Court has subjected to the
easement of intervener. These lands particularly are located
in Section 36, T. 2 S. R. 8 W; Section 2, T. 3 S. R. 8 W.;
Section 6, T. 2 S. R. 7 W. and Sections 29 and 31, T. 1 S.

R.7W.
We submit that as patent had issued on these lands for
less than twenty years prior to the commencement of this
action, as a matter of law there had not been twenty years
adverse use which could have arisen against these lands.
The evidence stands as we have heretofore pointed out
upon a stipulation between counsel submitted to the Court
that Deseret Livestock Company owns all of these lands set
out in the complaint, subject only to the easements provided
in the patents. Other than this stipulation the date of
the acquisition of the various lands by the Deseret Livestock Company is made to appear only as there was produced in evidence the various patents. These patents were
introduced by defendants. Defendants' Exhibit 10 shows
that Deseret Livestock Company acquired title to Section
36, Township 2 South, Range 8 West on the 9th day of
May, 1938. Defendants' Exhibit 11 shows that Deseret
Livestock Company received title to Section 2 Township
3 South, Range 8 West by patent from the State of Utah
on the 9th day of May, 1938.
We have heretofore quoted from the case of Tripp v.
Bagley, supra, to the effect that a prescriptive right of
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twenty years could not have run against these lands because
patent had not issued until1938, and the prescriptive period
commenced at that time, which meant that the prescriptive period had continued for not over nine years as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, conceding there had
been a use. The proposition is well established that a prescriptive right cannot be acquired against lands of the
United States and the State of Utah. We have heretofore
cited numerous cases to that effect, and conclusive is the
following from Page 643 of 28 C. J. Sec., wherein it is
stated:
((An easement by prescription cannot be acquired against the government nor against a subdivision thereof, such as a county, as to property
held for the public."
POINT NO. VII
THE INTERVENER COULD NOT BY LEASE
OR ASSIGNMENT TO THE SHARPS PERMIT
THEM TO USE OR ACQUIRE ANY EASEMENT
IN GROSS IN FAVOR OF INTERVENER, AND
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
TRESPASS AS TO THE DEFENDANTS SHARP.
The evidence shows that David Howells died in or
about the year 1938, and at the time of his death the defendant Ira Sharp and his wife formed a partnership for
the purpose of operating the sheep of the partnership.
There is no doubt about the fact that the sheep of defendants Sharp trespassed upon the lands of plaintiff, and defendants have attempted to justify this trespass upon the
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fact that Sharp was leasing lands of intervener, and that
as to each sheep there was one leg that belonged to intervener, and thereby the other three legs of the sheep for
some reason would be privileged, even though they belonged to Sharp.
The details of the transaction between Ira Sharp and
his wife Lois Cannon Sharp and the intervener, if in
writing were never presented in evidence. Mrs. Sharp is
the sister of Mrs. Howells, the widow of David Howells,
who was the owner of all of the stock of intervener. There
is in evidence, however, the lease of the lands of intervener
to Sharps. The interest of the Sharps in the operation of
the sheep appears only by the oral testimony and at Page
380 of the record Sharp states he has a joint venture with
them. On Page 3 81 defendants' counsel asked Sharp:

uQ. Now, Mr. Sharp, in the actual operation
of the livestock of these two companies that you
have mentioned, now do you run your sheep in
separate heads or are the sheep of one company
mixed with the sheep of the other?
I

l'

.;.

I [

A. They are mixed with-they are run jointly
and mixed."
Mr. Clyde asked Sharp at Page 3 81 of the transcript:

uQ. Do you each of you own a part of each
sheep?
Plaintiff's objection was overruled and the answer
was: uy own 37% of the company; Mrs. Sharp owns 37%
~
of the company and the Howells Livestock, Inc. owns
IBl 26% of the company, or livestock, I should say."

ndJ

I~
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At Page 414 of the transcript Sharp was asked the
question on cross-examination:

HQ. Now, these sheep that you got, did you
buy some sheep yourself in 19 37?
A.

I bought the sheep in 1939.

Q. Did you get a bill of sale with the sheep
in 1939?
A.

I did.

Q.

That was in your name?

A.

My name and my wife's name.

Q. And then in 1939, for the first time, you
began an operation for yourself?
A.

That is correct.

Q. And were you in any way combining your
sheep with any one else's sheep in 1939?
A.
else's?

Q.

Was I combining my sheep with anyone
Yes.

A. I combined them in joint venture with
the Howells Livestock, Inc.

Q. You got the bill of sale and you got title
to a certain number of sheep?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

Described by age and so on?

A.

That is correct.

Q. But a certain number of specific sheep
were yours?
A.

Understand, Mr.--
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Q.

You can answer that yes or no, can't you?

A.

State the question.

(Reporter read the question.)

uA.

Yes, I owned a certain percentage of the

sheep.

Q. Did your bill of sale read a percentage or
a certain number?
A.

It read a certain number."

We submit that there can be no other construction of
this testimony than that Sharp and his wife received title
to a certain number of sheep. These sheep represented 74%
of the number of sheep owned by intervener in 19 39.
There can be no other construction than that the intervener
sold a number of sheep representing 74% of its herd in
this transaction. If the number be 11,000, therefore, the
defendants Ira Sharp and Lois Cannon Sharp have received
title by bill of sale to 8140 sheep from intervener, so that
at the time the trespass took place, 8140 of the sheep belonged to defendants and 2860 belonged to intervener.
The sheep were commingled in the joint venture, and for
the right to use all of the lands of intervener the intervener
received 26% of all earnings of the venture.
In this argument we submit that Finding No. 6 is
entirely contrary to the evidence and the law, wherein
the Court found that Ira Sharp and Lois C. Sharp owned
74% of each particular sheep and Howells Livetsock Com,I pany, Inc., owns 26% of each particular sheep.
Our
quotations from the evidence and this matter clearly illustrate the error of the Court in so attempting to find.
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If intervener has acquired, as alleged and found by
the Court, an easement in gross to graze and trail its sheep
across the lands of plaintiff, then intervener cannot assign
that right because as a matter of law an easement in gross
is not assignable. It is personal only to the intervener.
1 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) at Page
559 states:

((An easement in gross is considered unassignable
and uninheritable. It is a mere personal interest in
the land of another; and it is so exclusively personal that the owner of the right can not permit
another person to enjoy it with him. An easement
in gross can not be made assignable or inheritable
by any words in the deed by which it was granted.
It is attached to the person to whom it is granted
and cannot exist except as so attached."
At Page 5 60 it is stated:
ttAn easement is personal when it is expressly
or by implication limited to the life of the person
who is to enjoy it."
As the easement in this case is not by the Court made
appurtenant to any land but is held by the Court to be one
in gross, it must be conceded that this easement is personal
to the intervener.
·
Ira Sharp and Lois C. Sharp, as to their 8140 sheep,
were trespassing and had no right to be on the land, and
could not by assignment or their joint venture go upon
these lands upon a claim of easement, because the law
refuses to recognize any attempt on the part of the holder
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' of an easement in gross to enlarge upon it or to assign it
or permit any other person to use it.
A judgment for trespass should have been granted
against the defendants Sharp, for the history of their operations commences only in 1939. We submit, therefore, that
by the attempt to enlarge upon the easement in gross by
assigning the same to Sharp, the intervener has thereby
lost any right it may have by way of an easement in gross,
for the legal reason that the attempt to dispose by assignment, lease or otherwise of that right in law extinguishes
that right.
In the case of Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal. App. 554;
229 Pac. 1002, at Page 1007 the question is presented as to

whether a roadway privilege was appurtenant to property
or was one in gross and personal to Moffat. The Court
said:
((The question is important, for if the easement was appurtenant it passed to respondent as an
incident to the land conveyed to him; whereas, if it
was personal to Moffat, it ceased to exist when the
latter deeded the property to Caldwell; for easements in gross (strictly speaking they are not easements) are not assignable or inheritable, and they
cannot be made so by any terms in the grant."

On page 2 of the Intervener's notice and motion to
.amend complaint in intervention and to reopen case to
' ~show survey of road, the following amendment to the
i 'complaint in intervention is made by intervener:

'

I

((That by said use of said property and the grazing of said forage, the intervener has acquired an
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easement in gross to trail across said property and
the right to graze 14,000 of his sheep on said property while trailing across it, between said new county road and said foothills on the east thereof, from
said Timpie Point to said Iosepa Ranch." (Emphasis
added.)
We desire again to call the court's attention to the
statement of Judge Ellett at page 599 of the transcript,
wherein he stated:
((They proved- I mean a private profit a
pendre across there, an easement in gross."
In the decree the court merely states that the intervener has a prescriptive right to trail and graze sheep over
the various courses. In the decree, however, there is no
provision that the prescriptive right is appurtenant to any
other land, and no place in the findings does it appear that '
the prescription is appurtenant and the conclusions do not
mention this matter. The judge, however, had at all times
indicated that he viewed the right as a personal right acquired only by the acts of the intervener and, as indicated
above, the intervener has by its own pleading, in which it
denominates its right as an easement in gross, so limited
and defined any right that they have. Conclusive of this
fact is the case of Evans vs. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 Pac.
239, where at page 240 this court says:
1

I
I

ccThe appellant in her reply disputes this and
asserts that the respondent is bound by the theory
of his allegations and of the findings that may not
now, on appeal from the judgment founded thereon, depart therefrom. We think the contention is
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well founded. The rule is well settled that on appeal
the parties are restricted to the theory on which the
case was prosecuted or defended in the court below."
This policy has been sustained in so many cases that we
submit that it does not require further authority.
In the Utah case of Ernst vs. Allen, 55 Utah 272,
184 Pac. 827, this court, at page 277, states:
HAn easement appurtenant, sometimes called
an easement proper, has been defined as follows: An
easement proper is a privilege which the owner of
one tenement has the right to enjoy in respect to
that tenement, in or over the tenement of another
person."
Again, the same authority 1n speaking of essential
elements states:
ttThe existence of an easement involves the
idea of two distinct tenements, a dominant estate
to which the right is accessorial and a servient
estate upon which it is a burden or charge. An
easement in gross is defined by the same authority
at page 2311 as follows: tAn easement in gross is
the mere personal interest in the real estate of another and is not assignable or inheritable. It dies

with the person and it is so exclusively personal that
the owner by right cannot take another person in
company with him.' The principal distinction between the two classes of easements seems to be that
in the easement appurtenant there must be a dominant tenement, while no such element exists in an
easement in gross." (Emphasis added)
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In 130 A. L. R., at page 1254, the rule is stated as
follows:
uit may be laid down as a general rule that in
the absence of something in the instrument creating
the easement indicating a contrary intention, an
easement in gross is a right personal to the one to
whom it is granted and cannot be assigned or otherwise transmitted by him to another."
The authority for this statement is supported by cases from
2 5 jurisdictions.

At page 1255 of the same volume of A. L. R., quoting
\Vashburn, Easements, 4th Edition, page 11, it is said:
uA man may have a way in gross over another's
land, but it must from its nature be a personal right,
not assignable nor inheritable."
In conclusion, on this argument we submit that the
intervener could not by lease or assignment give any rights
to the defendants and that the court erred in dismissing
the trespass as to the defendants Sharp.
POINT NO. VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ATTEMPT BY ITS
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT TO ESTABLISH
TITLE IN INTERVENER TO LANDS IN THREE
STATES AND V ARlO US COUNTIES AND PERMITTING A TACKING TO ESTABLISH AN
EASEMENT IN GROSS AS SUCH A RIGHT,
CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED BY A TRANSFER OF LAND.
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As pointed out in our argument in Point No. 7, the
court has not at any time found that any trail or road in
Skull Valley was appurtenant to any of the lands of the
intervener. We have heretofore pointed out the fact that
Judge Ellett stated that the right acquired was personal
to intervener and an easement in gross and was acquired
by the acts of the intervet?-er only. In Finding No. 2
the court finds title to certain lands in Juab County to be
in the intervener. In Finding No. 3 the court finds Howell
Livestock, Inc., the intervener, to be the owner of certain
lands at the northern tip of the Stansbury Ranch several
miles distant from the purported trail. In Finding No. 4
the court finds the intervener to be the owner of real property in Wyoming and in Summit County, Utah. We
submit that such finding is entirely immaterial and without
basis as far as the issues involved in this case are concerned.
This difficulty clouds the entire issue in this case and likewise makes indefinite and uncertain and clouds and further
encumbers the lands of the plaintiff. It is inconceivable
that a transfer of lands in Wyoming or Summit County,
Utah, will carry with it as an easement appurtenant lands
in Tooele County, Utah. It is likewise inconceivable that
a transfer of lands in Juab County, Utah, will carry with
it as an easement appurtenant a right of way in Skull
Valley. In each instance the eastern Utah and Wyoming
lands and the western Utah and Nevada lands are separated
from the claimed easement in Tooele by a distance of at
least 150 miles. The question will always remain whether a
transfer, therefore, of any particular part of any of these
lands could be claimed to transfer a portion of the right of
way. We submit that the fallacy of any such a claim be-
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comes apparent upon the mere recital of the facts. The said
argument must of necessity be true of the lands of intervener at what is called their Timpie Ranch at the Northern
point of the Stansbury Ranch. The lands of intervener
at Timpie are separated by a mountain range and several
miles of intervening land from the nearest point of the
claimed easement over the lands leased by the plaintiff.
We submit, therefore, at the outset that the finding
of the court as to the lands owned by the intervener are
entirely immaterial and as an attempt to establish a right
in an easement appurtenant must fail and as a right to
establish a tacking of adverse use for the benefit of intervener must likewise fail. It is therefore cited in the case
of Ernst v. Allen, 55 Ut. 272, 184 Pac. 827. Our Supreme
Court states at Page 277 of the Utah Report:
H (The existance of an easement involves the
idea of two distinct tenements; a dominent estate,\
to which the right is accessorial; and a servient
estate upon which it is a burden or charge.' "
H cAn easement in gross is a mere personal interest in the real estate of another, and is not assignable or inheritable. It dies with the person, and it
is so exclusively personal tha.t the owner by right
cannot take another person in company with him.'"
(Emphasis added)
HThe principal distinction between the two
classes of easements seems to be that in the easement
appurtenant there must be a dominant tenement,
while no such element exists in an easement in
gross."
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We submit, therefore, that the court erred in failing
to determine by its decree the nature of the easement it was
granting to the intervener, in failing definitely to describe
it either as an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant.
We submit that the finding establishing intervener and
its predecessors as the owner of certain lands would lend
support to a subsequent argument that the court had
interpreted the right as being one appurtenant to the lands
described. Such finding would lend further to the claim
that the intervener was entitled to tack the acts of others
who had owned such lands upon such use as made by the
intervener. Both such claims must fail in view of the pleadings and the determination of the court as stated by it in the
record and by the actual facts and law to the effect that any
claim of intervener must be that of an easement in gross
personal-to intervener and not appurtenant to any lands.
We submit that plaintiff is entitled to have this matter clarified where the entire value of its lands are confiscated for
the purpose of such easement. Certainly we should know if
our lands are to be confiscated whether that right is one that
can be assigned or must terminate with the use of the intervener. Certainly we are entitled to know whether it is such a
right as can be shared by the intervener with others by assignment, joint venture or lease.
In the case of Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 23
Ad. 20, 14 L. R. A. 300, the court at Page 21 states:
uAn easement in gross is a mere personal interest in the real estate of another and is not assignable or inheritable Washb. Easem. (4th Ed.)
12. Chancellor Kent, in speaking of such an ease-
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ment, says: (It dies with the person, and it is so
exclusively personal that the owner of the right cannot take another person in company with him.'"
Again at Page 22 of this same case, the court states:
(( (A man may have a way in gross over another's land, but it must from its nature be a personal right, not assignable nor inheritable;' ....We
think the greater weight of the authorities supports
the doctrine announced, that easements in gross,
properly so called, are not assignable or inheritable."
The court has found that the intervener had no right
to the use of the water of Burnt Springs by way of appropriation. Our law of appropriation has established certain
facts. One is to the effect that an appropriator cannot
initiate his right to appropriate water by trespass on the
lands of another. As the intervener had no right to the
water themselves, it could not be contended that he had
an easement in gross to go on the lands of plaintiff for the
purpose of taking waters from the spring. This because
one cannot initiate an appropriation of water by prescription. The only way this right could arrive in this case is
by way of adverse possession of a right of appropriation
of the plaintiffs. There is no evidence or finding to support
such an issue in this case. We submit, therefore, that
the provisions of the decree adjudging the intervener to
have established a right by prescription to water its sheep
at Burnt Springs is contrary to the pleadings, evidence, the
findings and the law in that it does not limit them to watering in any event in the spring and fall as they trail through.
Second, that the right cannot be determined as to whether
it is an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant by
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reason of the inclusion of the lands in the findings. In other
words it cannot be determined as to whether the easement
was created solely by the acts of the intervener and as one in
gross or appurtenant. In view of the two rights, therefore,
in one of the trail and the one of the easement at Burnt
Springs. We submit that the decree is so indefinite, that,
as a matter of law it must fail.

POINT NO. IX
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING INTERVENER TO SURVEY AND INTRODUCE IN
EVIDENCE A SURVEY OF A PURPORTED
ROAD AFTER THE CASE HAD BEEN TRIED
AND SUBMITTED AND WHICH SURVEY
DOES NOT FOLLOW ANY COURSE TESTIFIED TO BY ANY WITNESSES IN THE TRIAL
OF THE CASE.

During the course of the trial, Judge Ellett and the
' attorneys for all of the parties went out to view the pre. mises. This was after the testimony given by most of interveners' and defendants' witnesses, and it will be noted in
:the transcript at Page 522 wherein Mr. Clyde was asking
·to have the road surveyed as described by the witnesses.
:the court stated:

1

UTHE COURT:
ccThe difficulty with that is going to be this,
that if your surveying a straight line through and
take all of these witnesses out there, I may have
everyone of them disagreeing at some point with
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that trail. If I give you a trail I ought to do it on
the theory that I find where it goes and the witnesses
may let me down. Wherever I survey one, they
will say, (It isn't here. It was down there.' "
This, we submit, results in the obvious proposition that
the court was determining a roadway through Skull Valley,
which roadway was not supported by the evidence even
according to the courts own statement. Further it is not
supported by the evidence according to the testimony of
Mr. Clyde, who had this road surveyed.
After the case had been concluded and both parties
rested, the intervener then went out by counsel, Mr. Clyde,
and surveyed the course over which Judge Ellett was supposed to have walked 2 Yz months before. On October 21st,
several months after the conclusion of the trial, the intervener moved the court to admit into evidence this survey. :
(Tr. 597) This survey was admitted by the court over
the objections of the plaintiff upon the ground and for the
reason that the case had been tried under a theory of a
public easement going across these lands, and this was evi- ~
dence to show a private easement and further that this
was the first time in the proceedings that any description
of the land intended to be covered by the prescriptive right
was shown.
During the trial the witnesses for the defendants and
interveners marked on Defendants Exhibit No.5 (an aerial
photograph of the area) the place where they claimed
the road ran through the area. This same road was supposed to be indicated by dotted lines on Exhibit C of the
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intervener's complaint. Mr. Clyde was put on the witness
stand to testify as to this survey of the road found by the
court upon viewing the premises and testified as follows:

uQ But the Dotted line was also to follow the
road as indicated on the aerial photograph?
A. My understanding is that that dotted line
was the road he marked with x's and circles on the
aerial photograph map, yes sir.

Q. Do you know wheather the road as it appeared on the aerial map is the road that you had
surveyed?
A. I know that it isn't in its total."
The evidence of any roadway or trail as was submitted by
the interveners and defendants was limited to the aerial
photograph and the witnesses identification of it on the
aerial photograph. We submit that the tryer of the fact
has it within his power to go out and examine the premises
to give him a better understanding of the testimony of
the witnesses. Redd v. Airway Motor Corporation Lines,
Inc., 104 Ut. 9, 137 Pac (2d) 374. For a Utah case upholding the proposition that the view taken by the jury is not
for the purpose of taking independent testimony, see T. A.
Sorenson Co. v. Denver & Rio GrandeR. R. Co., 49 Ut.
548, at Page 553, 164 Pac. 1020. Our position in regard
to this is that the court cannot by merely viewing the premises determine which of the many roads and trails and
tracks through that valley was used for a period in excess
of twenty years. The only way that this prescriptive use
can be determined in this case, is by the testimony of the
witnesses themselves. No witness identified any such
1
1
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road as existing at the time of the trial. No witness stated
which of many tracks it might be. The course the court
followed is entirely different than that pleaded by intervener and proved by them during the trial as the one
they claimed and had used. This road as found by the
Judge in viewing the premises is entirely contrary to the
law and the evidence in the case, and the survey should
not have been admitted in evidence.
All of the testimony of the intervener and defendants
was to the effect that if there was any claim through this
valley, it was marked on Exhibit 5 and according to Mr.
Clyde's own testimony the dotted line on Exhibit C of the
Complaint in Intervention was supposed to represent the
trail testified to by the witnesses of the interveners and
when Mr. Clyde was asked whether or not the trail surveyed
is the same one testified to he says, eel know that it isn't
in its total." (Tr. 606.)
With the introduction of this survey it was the first :
time that any claimed way by the defendants and inter- :
vener was identified by metes and bounds. In the very
beginning of the proceedings the plaintiff objected to the
fact that the complaint did not identify the route claimed.
This objection was raised by special demurrer and the demurrer was stricken by the court. Thus throughout the
trial the plaintiff was not able to ascertain what road or
where the road went which was claimed by the intervener
and defendants. Reference was made to a line on the aerial
photo by some of the witnesses who were not acquainted
with the old road. Whereas others who had such a road in
mind could not agree that was the road. This was the first
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time that there had been any definite assertion to a road
or trail by metes and bounds. It was not only the first
time that there had been such a definition of the way but
also it broadened the pleadings to include a profit a prendre.
All during the trial the plaintiff had no opportunity to
plead to any claim of profit a prendre, nor did the plaintiff
have any opportunity to plead to the road as surveyed.
There was no issue during the trial on a profit a prendre.
The admission of this survey took place several months
after the trial, and after both sides had rested. As we
have heretofore indica ted this survey does not conform
to the roadway claimed by the dotted line on Exhibit C
to the complaint, nor is it the same as the one pointed to
by the witnesses on the aerial photo. Certainly the plaintiff
should have been given a chance to plead and submit evidence upon the new roadway claimed at this late stage in
the action. And likewise on the issue of the profit. Plaintiff
objected to the introduction of this survey (Tr. 598-599)
upon the grounds that it sought to establish a private
trail, which had never been claimed before this in these
proceedings, and also upon the grounds that it was the
first time that any issue of a profit a prendre was claimed.
Such objection should have been sustained since it raised
entirely new material after the case had been tried.
((An amendment improperly changing the
cause of action may not be objected to by way of
answer setting up such change as a defense, or by
an allegation in the answer that the complaint was
improperly filed; the proper remedy is by objection
to the filing of the amendment, or by motion to
strike the amended pleading from the files."
1 Bancroft on Code Pleading, p. 758.
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The inclusion of the issue of a profit a prendre was
entirely new and foreign to the whole case. It had never
been pleaded before and no issue or discussion of it was had
at any point in the proceedings. To introduce the theory of
a profit a prendre after the whole case had been tried and
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to meet such
an issue violates one of the most cardinal principles of law.
1 Bancroft on Code Pleading, p. 24, states:

Hit must be noted that the theory of pleadings
as affecting the statement of a cause of action or defense is to be distinguished from a theory of the case
adopted upon the trial. In the latter case the party
adopting a theory is generally bound by it. Such
a rule rests fundamentally in the principle that
a plaintiff ·cannot allege one cause of action and
recover upon another. To permit a recovery under
such circumstances would be to license deception
in pleading and violate the cardinal purposes of the
law in requiring that the pleader state the cause of
action or ground of defense (upon which he relies'"
Again at page 788 we find:
((Amendements made to the complaint after
trial, and for the purpose of making it conform to
the proof, must rest upon such proof, and cannot
go beyond it, since they are not made for the purpose
of framing issues for the trial, but to supply some
technical defect, or, perhaps, upon the supposition
that certain issues have been tried which are different from those framed by the pleadings."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus in the principal case, the survey of the road
should not have been allowed because it did not conform
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to any proof. There was no evidence as to the location
K: of the road at the points surveyed. Reference was always
:ll made to the aerial photo and Mr. Clyde himself admits
4'r that the survey does not follow the road indicated on the
::t: photo as we have heretofore pointed out. The only conte elusion that can be reached is that the court should have
tt~~ sustained the objection, to the introduction of the survey
and amended pleadings and new issue.

llat

POINT NO. X

:~:

THE COURT ERRED IN DECREEING THAT
THE WATERS OF BURNT SPRINGS WERE
PUBLIC AND SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
AND THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO TITLE, APPROPRIATION OR OWNERSHIP TO THE
WATERS OF THE SPRING FOR THE REASON
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NOT PUT IN ISSUE
ITS TITLE TO THE WATERS, AND THE DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENERS IN THEIR
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A RIGHT COULD
NOT HAVE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT ADJUDICATED.

~:r::

An examination of plaintiff's complaint will not show
~C~Jl' any claim on the part of the plaintiff to the waters of Burnt
~~,~;Springs in this action. This was strictly an action by the
~-::;r plaintiff to enjoin the trespassing of the defendants and
:C::? to recover damages for the trespass and the matter of
r:i6: plaintiff's right to the waters of Burnt Spring were never
::r put in issue at the trial. The only way the question arose
~:;-.::.as to the waters of Burnt Springs is through the complaint
f ~in intervention and the cross complaint of the defendants
0
.. s~tting up that they have an appropriation right in the
nor~·
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waters of Burnt Springs. This, of course, was denied by
the plaintiff but no affirmative issue was raised in the pleadings as to the plaintiff's right or title to the waters of
Burnt Springs. Certainly nothing can be more basic in our
law than that a decree of a court upon matters not put in
issue by any of the pleadings is void and contrary to law.
The case of Evans vs. Shand (Supra) at Page 240 of the
Pacific Report, this court has said:
((Whatever liberality may be accorded procedure, there nevertheless are certain fundamental
principles, which cannot be disregarded. These,
among others, are that pleadings are the juridicial
means to invest the court with subject matter jurisdiction and to limit issues and to renew proofs;
that courts cannot make a complaint for one thing, 1
stand for a different thing; that recovery must
be secundu1n allegata et probata, which is but
a necessary deduction from the maxim that is
not juridically presented cannot be judicially decided; that the statement of the cause of action
or ground or defense as laid binds the court as
well as the parties; that there must be no departure ,
is but another statement of the maxim that it I
is vain to prove what is not alleged. These principles
are primary."
Thus, in the principal case, it will be observed that
the plaintiff's right and title to the waters of Burnt Springs:
were never put in issue. Finding No. 29 of the court'
finds that the plaintiff has not established any right whatsoever to the use of the waters at Burnt Springs, except as
a member of the general public, and the plaintiff has never
made any appropriation, either by diligence or by statutory filing. That the waters of the springs were at the time
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of filing this action, public waters and every member of
the public had an equal right of use. Further in the
decree of the court the court has stated uit is further
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the waters of Burnt
Springs in Skull Valley, Tooele County, Utah, adjacent to
the public road described above is surface stream, and that
the waters thereof were at the time this action was commenced public unappropriated waters, and that the same
were subject to public appropriation, and that the plaintiff
has no special right, title, estate of interest therein by reason
of the ownership of the lands upon which the springs arise
or by reason of any diligence, right or statutory appropriation, and that all parties hereto at the time of the
:filing of this action had equal rights to the use of the
waters thereof as members of the general public." The
defendants and interveners in their complaint and cross
claim attempted to set up the title to the water of Burnt
Springs in themselves and to quiet title to these waters in
themselves. The most that the trial court could find is
that if the defendants and interveners had any right the
court could determine whether or not the plaintiff had
any adverse right thereto but having found that the defendants and interveners had no right to the waters, the
court could then go on and find also that the plaintiff had
no right. In the case of Home Qu;ners Loan Corporation
v. Dudley, 105 Ut. 208, 141 Pac. (2d) 160, we have an
action to quiet title to real property and this court has said
at Page 218 of the Utah Report:
((Plaintiff could prevail on a claim of record
title only by showing good title in itself, not byshowing some defects in the title of defendants."
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To the same effect See Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Ut. 10,
94 Pac. (2d) 862.
I

This court has held in the case of Logan, Hyde Park.
a.nd Smithfield Canal Company v. Logan City, 72 Ut. 221269, Pac. 776:

1

HA right to use a definite quantity of water of
a particular source is just as specific a thing in
legal contemplation as an estate in land and the
title to one is quieted in precisely the same manner
as the other."

We submit, therefore, that the court finding interveners and defendants had not appropriated the waters,
the title of Deseret Live Stock in and to the waters of
Burnt Springs could not have been adjudicated in this matter, and it was clearly error and contrary to the law for the
court to proceed to enter a decree adjucating plaintiff's
rights in the waters when there was no issue in the pleadings
to support such decree.

POINT NO. XI
THE COURT ERRED IN DECREEING THE
RIGHT OF INTERVENER TO TRAIL AND
GRAZE ITS SHEEP OVER ALL OF SECTION 36,
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 8 WEST, AND
SECTION 2, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 8
WEST, AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN ANY FINDING OR JUDGMENT OF
SUCH EASEMENT.
There is no evidence in the entire transcript that
the defendants or interveners were ever upon Sections 2
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· and 36 aforesaid, except on the occasion of the trespass
in the year 1947. For this reason we have heretofore submitted in our argument and authorities under Point No. 2
·that any attempt of the court to decree an easement over
all of Sections 2 and 3 6 is entirely contrary to law and there
is no evidence to support any findings or decree that the
interveners or defendants had ever had their herds upon
those two sections for any prescriptive period. We have
likewise heretofore pointed out that these two sections
were conveyed by the State of Utah to the plaintiff
corporation in 1938, and that for this reason, as well as
the reasons under Point 2, the court could not decree an
easement to trail over all of these sections for the reason
that the prescriptive period of twenty years could not
have run since the lands were acquired from the state.
Inasmuch as the court has attempted, however, to
separate these two sections from all the other lands and
specifically decree a right to trail over them, we desire
herein to point out specifically to the court's attention
the error of the district court in so doing. These two
sections adjoin on the Southwest corner of Section 3 6 and
the Northeast corner of Section 2. Together they would
extend east and west for an area of two miles. We
submit that in view of the fact that the prescriptive period
could not have run and in view of the fact that there was
no evidence that the interveners or defendants had ever
been on the sections other than the year in which the trespass was complained of in this proceeding, there was no
authority nor justification in law or equity to support
Judge Ellett's confiscating these lands from the plaintiff
and turning them over to the defendants.
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It is also interesting that the court has given to the
interveners and defendants a right to graze and trail an
area approximately 3 000 feet in width and then without
evidence or pleadings, these two sections are selected and
a right given to trail only over them. Nothing could more
clearly evidence the literal application by Judge Ellett in
this case of the scriptural admonition ((ask and ye shall
receive." We suggest that the generosity of the court must
be based, however, on sound legal principles, none of which ;
can be found to support this decree. There was no evidence, pleading or finding to support the judgment.
Finding No. 13 that these two sections were purchased
from the state of Utah by plaintiff in 1919 is not supported
by the evidence. In our Point 6, we have detailed the
only evidence on these two sections as contained in the
patents introduced by defendants, which show patent
issued in 19 3 8. There is nothing in evidence as to the
title of these two sections other than the patents and the
stipulation of counsel that plaintiff is the owner of the fee
and entitled to possession other than for easements created
by the patent. No evidence can be pointed to which will
show any use of these two sections by the intervener.
We submit that this court will never sustain the gift
to intervener of 1280 acres of fee lands of the plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION

'tt
:t:

In conclusion we respectfully submit that this court

~~ should enter its order reversing the district court and setting

aside its decree in its entirety, and that this court enter as
;£t a final judgment a decree perpetually enjoining the inter:1> vener and the defendants from trespassing upon any and
~i:· all of the lands of the plaintiff described in the complaint
l~~ of the plaintiff, and awarding to the plaintiff judgment for
iU damages for the trespass of defendants and intervener upon
~the lands of the plaintiff.
OU!C:

~puti!

The country herein involved is open and unenclosed
.
; ·.,land. Stnce about 1920 Tooele County has constructed and
~maintained through Tooele County a graded county road
~~:located shortly east of and paralleling the old Lincoln High::c"i: way south through that desert area. The state and county
::.~have furnished for approximately 30 years a maintained
·-;.highway north and south for 150 miles, and extending over
:~~into Nevada. The vehicles of all kinds, of the intervener
.. ri:and of all of the public, have followed that main highway.
- ... Over this entire course of 15 0 miles or more in Tooele
- County the intervener and defendants have attempted to
:riJ:secure for themselves the entire surface rights to lands, the
::::.:fee title of a portion of which is owned by the plaintiff and
- a portion of which is leased by plaintiff from the other fee
owners. The intervener and defendants have attempted to
justify the grazing and trailing privileges over these lands
by the occasional and varied meanderings of their herds as
they were driven north and south through this valley, not
more than twice in any year.
F~~·

-~;_>.
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For the reasons set forth in our brief, we sincerely
submit to the court that there has been no evidence submitted to establish here an additional public road to the
east of the old Lincoln Highway and to the east of the
present main county highway, and there is no evidence to
sustain a private easement for trailing, nor a profit a
prendre to graze on the lands of plaintiff in that area. We
have further conclusively presented to the court the fact
that pleadings of the intervener and defendants were fatally I
defective and cannot support either the public road, a profit
a prendre or the easement to trail. Particularly have we·
pointed out to the court that there was never at any time 1
any easement in any way referred to or pleaded over any
lands of the plaintiff in the Burnt Spring area.
We submit further that on all of those lands where i
the patent has not issued for twenty years, or where title :
is still held by the state of Utah, there could be no prescrip- :
tive right acquired because that period cannot commence'
until the lands are conveyed from the state of Utah. The.
attempt by the intervener to assign or lease their easement
in gross to the defendants we submit has resulted in a loss '
of any easement that they may have had, and certainly
could not convey any rights to the defendants, as such
rights are not assignable nor can they be shared. The attempt of the court to include in the :findings a description
of lands in Nevada, Wyoming and eastern and western
Utah further beclouds the rights decreed to the intervener
and defendants in implying that the intervener and defendants could tack the acts of others to create their rights,j
whereas such is entirely contrary to law in these circum·
stances.
1
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We submit that the court erred in permttttng the
intervener and defendants, over the objection of plaintiff,
to amend their complaint after trial to include a profit a
prendre, to include a private easement and to include a
survey of a course the court chose, which course the court
admitted would not be supported by the evidence, and this
was prejudicial error requiring the reversal of the district
court's judgment.
We submit that the district court erred in attempting
to decree and determine the rights of the plaintiff in and to
the water of Burnt Spring when the only issue was the
rights of the intervener and defendants to said waters, and
this was likewise reversible error because there was no
issue or pleading to support the decree of the court.
Similarly, we submit as conclusive error on the part
of the district court the decreeing to intervener and defendants of a right to trail over all of Section 2, Township
3 South, Range 8 West, and Section 36, Township 2 South,
Range 8 West, inasmuch as the patent had not issued on
said land until 1938 and there was no evidence whatsoever
that the intervener or defendants or their animals had ever
been upon any portion of these two sections. We submit
:that the judgment of the district court is unreasonable and
.unjust and inequitable in decreeing to the intervener all of
the sole and only benefit provided by the 1280 acres in
these two sections; i.e., the feed growing thereon, and
that his lack of judgment and the necessity for the reversal
of that judgment becomes obvious. The net effect of this
decree is to actually cast upon the plaintiff the burden of
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paying the taxes and maintaining the land and to give to
the defendants a deed to the one and only use to which the
land can be put.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN
and RICHARDS,

Attorneys for Appellant
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